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Abstract 
 
The genius of Benjamin Franklin resides not in his unique personality or worldly manner 
but in his distinct ability to eloquently express his ideas in written form. One of his most notable 
and peculiar scripted expressions emanated from his desire to assert American authority in peace 
negotiations with Great Britain in the final stages of the American Revolution. Franklin’s 
“Supplement” to the Boston Independent Chronicle, printed in 1782 at his press at Passy, 
satirized British political and economic procedure in an effort to illuminate British hypocrisy and 
defend American interests in the peace process. Though the “Supplement” has only recently 
earned a noticeable position in the narrative of Franklin’s biographical studies, the “Supplement” 
provides not only a glimpse into the evolution of Franklin’s philosophical ideas and political 
mentality but also a reflection of his efforts to secure a beneficial compromise through the Treaty 
of Paris. The two letters contained within the “Supplement,” a letter by Samuel Gerrish on Indian 
violence against American soldiers and civilians and another by John Paul Jones on British 
claims of piracy against America, were fabricated by Franklin and published as authentic articles 
by newspapers throughout both America and Britain. Though there is no evidence Franklin ever 
intended to mislead his audience with his claims, Franklin expected his publication to instigate 
conversation and provoke public reaction over the conduct of Parliament and the Crown. The 
“Supplement’s” allegations reflected Franklin’s purpose throughout the peace process to ensure 
restitution between American and Britain and arrange American’s diplomatic future as an 
autonomous nation. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction, Background, and Historiography 
Benjamin Franklin remains one of the most recognizable figures in American history. His 
appearance graces the face of American currency; his adages are quoted in spite of their 
antiquity. Dozens of biographies have been written on his life while there additionally exists 
hundreds of focused studies on his faith, politics, and personality. His reputation continues to 
provoke historians and scholars to study his numerously broad interests and occupations.1 
Franklin is perhaps most famous for the numerous articles, essays, letters, and pamphlets he 
produced concerning a vast array of subjects from science to religion. Known for his clever 
humor and perceptive intellect, Franklin often chose the written word as an outlet for both his 
frustrations and achievements.  Some of Franklin’s most intriguing compositions dealt with 
topics on politics and the American Revolution; his Revolutionary publications and propaganda 
continue to offer insight into the political ideology that Franklin embraced. Franklin wrote 
deliberately, placing much care and thought into his expositions. Each article had objective and 
purpose. Franklin frequently used his masterful wit and sarcasm to address controversial topics 
and scold powerful entities without directly challenging authority. These qualities helped 
produce some of the most fascinating political literature in early American history. 
One of Franklin’s more obscure publications and a portion of his work which still 
deserves historical analysis due to its intriguing political messages is the “Supplement” to the 
                                                          
1  For standard academic biographies of Benjamin Franklin, see Walter Isaacson, Benjamin 
Franklin: An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003); H.W. Brands, The  First 
American:  The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin (New York: Anchor Books, 2002); Thomas Kidd, 
Benjamin Franklin:  The Religious Life of a Founding Father, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2017); and Ellen R. Cohn et al, eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2017).  
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Boston Independent Chronicle, published in 1782 as the Revolutionary War drew to a close and 
peace negotiations between Britain and America commenced. Franklin, acting as American 
ambassador, had been stationed in France for several years and established his own printing 
press just outside of Paris in the village of Passy. There Franklin resided in an estate allocated to 
him by the wealthy French businessman Jacques-Donatien Le Ray de Chaumont until 1785 when 
Franklin concluded his tenure in France. In Passy, Franklin created important and amusing works 
such as the Bagatelles and other articles and essays on his political ideas. One of his most 
notable publications on the press at Passy was his “Supplement” which he intended to distribute 
as an authentic issue of the newspaper the Boston Independent Chronicle, a colonial periodical 
produced in the city whose name it bears. The “Supplement,” however, was an entirely fictitious 
exposition of Franklin’s own design. A product of Franklin’s frustrations concerning Britain’s 
past conduct toward America as well as the details of the peace negotiation process, the 
“Supplement” itself included two separate and distinct letters written under the aliases of 
important American military officers. These letters challenged the intentions and exploits of the 
British government and military and illuminated important aspects of Franklin’s political 
opinions.  
Franklin’s “Supplement” was an expression of his frustration with British control and 
conduct as well as an attempt to uncover the duplicity of the British government. This research 
will seek to evaluate the context for the details of the “Supplement” as well as express the value 
of the article as a recorded summation of Franklin’s concerns with British political designs and 
his desires to affect impending peace. The first section of the “Supplement” included the 
fabricated letter written by Captain Samuel Gerrish and addressed gruesome attacks by the 
Seneca Indians on American civilians and soldiers while the second section of the article 
3 
 
contained a fictional letter written by American naval commander John Paul Jones addressing 
charges of piracy and misconduct against the American navy, especially charges against Jones’s 
exploits and the mistreatment of American prisoners of war.2 The brilliance of Franklin’s 
“Supplement” dwells not in its satire or deception but in its candid expression of the British 
brutalities and injustices against America.  
Franklin, though not a pacifist in the truest nature of the word, possessed an aversion to 
open opposition as well as a distinct distaste of direct altercation. Franklin turned to his writing 
to convey his opinion on sensitive subjects, sometimes preferring to remain completely 
anonymous while he attacked his enemies by paper and pen.3 Franklin preferred print even for 
assessment of his own flaws. His catalogue of virtues and private appraisal of his weekly conduct 
in his autobiography regarding virtues such temperance, order, humility, and other admirable 
qualities reveal his desire for personal growth and maturity. Franklin sought a life void of 
spectacle and mayhem, desiring peace rather than conflict.4  These qualities led Franklin to 
publish essays and articles not only on personal idealism but also on the necessary qualities of 
empires and nations. Because of Franklin’s aversion to open hostility, he chose to verbally attack 
entities such as the British government and the Crown at the press level instead of directly 
approaching Parliament or King George.5 
                                                          
2 Benjamin Franklin, “’Supplement’ to the Boston Independent Chronicle, [before 22 April 
1782],” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 37, March 16 through August 15, 1782, ed. Ellen R. Cohn, 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 184-196. 
 
3 Jonathan Dull, Benjamin Franklin and the American Revolution (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2010), 1. 
 
4 Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, Albert Henry Smyth, ed. (New 
York: American Book Company, 1907), 152-154. 
 
5 Dull, American Revolution, 86. 
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 Franklin used print for decades as a medium to circulate his thoughts and opinions 
regarding the British Empire. In 1729, Franklin acquired his own newspaper, the Pennsylvania 
Gazette. Through this newspaper, Franklin often published his political opinions, sometimes 
using pennames to maintain anonymity. Franklin said of his newspaper in his autobiography, “I 
considered my newspaper, also, as another means of communicating instruction.”6 Franklin often 
established the objectives of resistance and political protest through his editorials. The infamous 
cartoon “JOIN, or DIE” Franklin published in his newspaper in 1754 was widely circulated 
throughout the colonies as a symbol of unified resistance against the French during the French 
and Indian War. Franklin’s cartoon also represented an effort to rally support for unification of 
the colonies under his proposed Albany Plan, a political proposal for an integrated colonial 
government.7  
In 1766, in response to the Stamp Act and Britain’s growing pressure on the American 
colonies, Franklin produced the grotesque propaganda piece “Magna Britannia,” a picture 
depicting a woman with amputated extremities representative of both the disbandment of the 
American colonies and the destruction of the British Empire as she increasingly alienated her 
foreign holdings and supporting populations.8 Despite these bold publications, Franklin was 
careful to emphasize that his newspapers were not meant for defamation, but for the perpetuation 
of education on valuable subjects. “In the conduct of my newspaper, I carefully excluded all 
                                                          
 
6 Franklin, Autobiography, 170. 
 
7 Benjamin Franklin, “JOIN, or DIE,” May 9, 1754, Pennsylvania Gazette, found in Prints and 
Photographs Division, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2002695523/. 
 
8 Benjamin Franklin “Magna Britannia: Her Colonies Reduced [January - February, 1766,” The 
Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 13, January 1- December 31, 1766, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969), 66-72.  
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libelling and personal abuse, which of late years become so disgraceful to our country,” Franklin 
insisted in his autobiography.9 In 1775, Franklin presented in the Pennsylvania Evening Post a 
satirical inscription discussing the death of Charles I, British king beheaded during the English 
Civil War.  In this passage, Franklin coined the phrase, “Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to 
God,”10 a slogan which became an important motto for the Revolution.11 These excerpts from 
Franklin’s periodical represented his attempts at insurgence through printed means and 
illustrated not only his ability to articulate dissatisfaction with current political systems but also 
his aversion to direct confrontation with powerful entities.   
The “Supplement,” written as the Revolution drew to a close and negotiations between 
Britain and America progressed, provided Franklin the opportunity to profess his controversial 
opinions over British policies and military conduct from the safety of his press at Passy. The 
“Supplement” to the Boston Independent Chronicle was printed in two editions. The first edition 
contained a letter by Samuel Gerrish as well as a few advertisements written by Franklin, 
although historians have found no evidence that the first edition was ever published.12 The 
second edition, and the article discussed in this research, contained the letter by Gerrish on 
Indian atrocities as well as the fabricated letter by John Paul Jones.  
                                                          
9 Franklin, Autobiography, 171. 
 
10 Benjamin Franklin, “’Bradshaw’s Epitaph’: A Hoax Attributed to Franklin, 14 December, 
1775,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 22, March 23, 1775 through October 27, 1776, ed. William 
B. Willcox (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 303-304.  
 
11 Carla Mulford. Benjamin Franklin and the Ends of Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 278-279. 
 
12 Carla, Mulford, “Benjamin Franklin’s Savage Eloquence: Hoaxes from the Press at Passy, 
1782,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 152, No. 4 (2008): 496. 
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Franklin’s first letter, written under Gerrish’s name, was a message to Gerrish’s 
commander following a raid by an American convoy on a stock of British army supplies. The 
letter included a register of items found among the discovered supplies written by British 
personnel James Crauford. The letter described the acquisition of scalps taken from an Indian 
raid against American soldiers and civilians and described the unfortunate events which led to 
the procurement of the scalps. The “Supplement” stated, “At the Request of the Senneka Chiefs I 
send herewith to your Excellency, under the Care of James Boyd, eight Packs of Scalps, cured, 
dried, hooped and painted, with all the Indian triumphal Marks, of which the following is Invoice 
and Explanation.”13  
The transcription continued to list a rather gruesome and shocking account of the 
numerous scalps obtained by the British convoy, including forty-three scalps of American 
soldiers, nearly three hundred scalps of farmers, as well as the scalps of women and children. 
Franklin’s descriptions gave details to how and when the scalps were acquired which alluded to 
surprise attack and possible torture. Franklin also included in the letter messages from Seneca 
Indian chiefs. The messages were saturated with vicious mockery that berated not only the king 
of England, but the British people for their use of the native populations against the American 
colonies.14 Franklin, writing as one of the Indian chiefs, stated, “We have only to say farther that 
your Traders exact more than ever for their Goods: and our Hunting is lessened by the War, so 
that we have fewer Skins to give for them. This ruins us. Think of some Remedy. We are poor: 
                                                          
13 Franklin, “Supplement,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 184-196. 
 
14 Ibid. 
 
7 
 
and you have Plenty of every Thing. We know you will send us Powder and Guns, and Knives 
and Hatchets: but we also want Shirts and Blankets.”15 
Franklin additionally expressed through the comments of the Seneca Chiefs that the 
American colonies were no longer willing or able to be controlled by the British Empire. 
Franklin stated his frustration with the British-Indian alliance that was so blatantly one-sided. 
While the British reaped the benefits of the partnership by coercing the Indians into war against 
the colonies, the British made feeble, empty promises to compensate the Indians for their service. 
“Attend to what I am now going to say: it is a Matter of much Weight. The great King’s Enemies 
are many, and they grow fast in Number,” through the words of the Seneca chief, Franklin 
described the dilemma faced by those tribes who had allied themselves to the British. The 
enemies that were once “like young Panthers” were transformed to adversaries “big as the Elk, 
and strong as the Buffalo,” capable of overpowering and even destroying the native 
populations.16 Certainly, Americans were angered at British coercion of Indian force against 
American homes and populations, prompting Franklin to write, “They have driven us out of our 
Country for taking Part in your Quarrel,” but despite any protests from Indian authorities on 
these issues, Britain held the advantage monetarily, politically, and militarily over any native 
tribes or nations. Because of this advantage, there was little chance that Britain would ever 
provide fair compensation for Indian contributions to the war. Franklin satirized the false hope 
created by the British alliances with the Indian tribes with the following proclamation, “We 
                                                          
15 Franklin, “Supplement,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 184-196. 
 
16 Ibid. 
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expect the great King will give us another Country, that our Children may live after us, and be 
his Friends and Children, as we are. Say this for us to the great King.”17 
Carla Mulford argues in her ground-breaking work Benjamin Franklin and the Ends of 
Empire that Franklin’s reference to civilian groups whom he viewed as non-threatening, such as 
women, children, and clergymen, reveals Franklin’s conviction that the British were prone to 
aggression and violence. Mulford states, “The Selection brings home the seediness and brutality 
of British war efforts: Britain rewarded, with liberal presents of arms, Indian hatchet-men who 
otherwise were abhorred, and Britain supported attacks against noncombatant American civilians 
of British descent.”18 Though some historians have suggested Franklin exaggerated his points in 
the “Supplement,” he fully believed he was accurately if not conservatively representing British 
atrocities. In a letter to John Adams in April of 1782, Franklin admitted, “I believe the Number 
of People actually scalp’d in this murdering War by the Indians to exceed what is mention’d in 
the Invoice, and that Muley Istmael (a happy Name for a Prince as obstinate as a Mule) is full as 
black a Tyrant as he is represented in Paul Jones’s pretended Letter.”19  
Franklin’s second letter of the “Supplement,” written in the name of John Paul Jones, was 
an expression of Franklin’s frustration toward British colonial processes and Britain’s refusal to 
acknowledge the misconduct toward America. Franklin was particularly disturbed by British 
refusal to exchange American prisoners of war and by the treatment of American prisoners 
                                                          
17 Franklin, “Supplement,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 184-196. 
 
18 Carla Mulford, Ends of Empire, 299.  
 
19 Benjamin Franklin, “To John Adams from Benjamin Franklin, 22 April, 1782,” The Papers of 
John Adams, vol. 12, October 1781 – April 1782, eds. Gregg L. Lint et al. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 447-448.  
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whom the British consistently terrorized with malnutrition and mistreatment and coerced into 
military service. America was a colony of Britain, yet Britain regarded Americans as traitors, 
refusing to give American soldiers the same courtesy of even Britain’s international enemies.20 
Franklin, in turn, called British actions piratical for their blatant disregard of diplomatic and 
moral standards, “You had even the baseness to corrupt our servants, the sailors employed by us, 
and encourage them to rob their masters, and bring to you the ships and goods they were 
entrusted with. Is there any society of pirates on the sea or land, who . . . have less authority than 
your parliament? Do any of them more justly than your parliament deserve the title you bestow 
on me?”21 
In the objective of the second letter was a longstanding point of indignation for Franklin. 
One of Franklin’s primary objectives in his diplomatic mission was to oversee the affairs of 
prisoners. Franklin’s position as ambassador as well as the various political connections he made 
throughout his years as diplomat made him an ideal candidate to negotiate prisoner exchanges. 
Britain, however, was notoriously uncooperative in conducting negotiations with prisoners.22 
Franklin was not only alarmed by British refusal to exchange prisoners, but he was also disturbed 
by the treatment American soldiers received once captured, who often were deprived of adequate 
food and shelter and frequently confined to prison ships or sent to various other corners of the 
British Empire. Franklin noted in a letter to Lord Viscount Stormont, prominent British 
politician, “The United States are not unacquainted with the barbarous Treatment their People 
                                                          
20 Caroline Prelinger, “Benjamin Franklin and the American Prisoners of War in England during 
the American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 32, No. 2 (1975): 290. 
 
21 Franklin, “Supplement,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 184-196. 
 
22 Prelinger, “Prisoners,” 261-263. 
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receive, when they have the Misfortune of being your Prisoners here in Europe: And that if your 
Conduct towards us is not altered, it is not unlikely that severe Reprisals may be thought 
justifiable, from the Necessity of putting some Check to such abominable Practices.”23  
British attitude toward American prisoners was in part due to an act issued by Prime 
Minister Frederick North, Second Earl of Guilford, or Lord North, as he is more commonly 
known, and passed by Parliament five years before. This act not only sentenced all captured 
American prisoners with the crime of treason and piracy, but also discouraged standard humane 
treatment to such prisoners, degrading American prisoners below the status of even Britain’s 
international enemies.24 Franklin and American naval commander John Paul Jones had a long 
history of correspondence on prisoner of war exchange. Franklin, concerned with the welfare of 
American prisoners because of the act instituted by Lord North, was determined to arrange 
negotiations to exchange American prisoners with captured British soldiers. Jones shared 
Franklin’s frustration with British lack of cooperation and Franklin’s desire to capture British 
sailors for leverage against the British. Jones attempted to act as an intermediary for Franklin in 
handling the details of arranging prisoner exchanges but in doing so, alienated the British.. A 
battle between the Bonhomme Richard and the British ship the Serapis in 1779, where Jones 
seized British sailors and their ship, prompted Franklin’s letter in the “Supplement.”  
The British were furious with Jones’s detention of British soldiers and property, but Jones 
intended to retain the British prisoners he had captured in particular defiance to the British 
                                                          
23 Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, “The American Commissioners to Lord 
Stormont, April 2, 1777,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 23, October 23, 1776 through April 30, 
1777, ed. William B. Willcox (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 548-549. 
 
24 Prelinger, “Prisoners,” 264. 
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capture and mistreatment of American Naval Captain Gustavus Conyngham who had been 
arrested several times by the British, accused of piracy, and imprisoned.25 Jones wrote to 
Franklin, “I am determined to keep in my hands the Captain of the Serapis as an Hostage for 
Cunninghams release as a prisoner of War.” Jones, like Franklin, wished to see an exchange of 
troops initiated by the British, “With respect to the other prisoners now in my hands, If the 
English Ambassador Sir J.Y. will give us Security in his public Character that an Equal number 
and denomination of Americans shall be Sent immediatly to France,” 26 Jones promised. 
These words provoked British outrage against Jones and the American navy and triggered 
the accusations of piracy which Franklin addressed in the Jones letter. Franklin asserted, “A 
pirate makes war for the sake of rapine. This is not the kind of war I am engaged in against 
England.” Franklin championed American defense of British encroachment, “Our’s is a war in 
defence of liberty . . . the most just of all wars; and of our properties, which your nation would 
have taken from us, without our consent, in violation of our rights, and by an armed force.” 
Franklin then turned the accusations of piracy on Britain, “Your’s, therefore, is a war 
of rapine; of course, a piratical war: and those who approve of it, and are engaged in it, more 
justly deserve the name of pirates, which you bestow on me.”27  
Both letters in the “Supplement” were the response to broader issues which Franklin 
spent much time and energy not only writing about but also attempting to rectify. Franklin’s 
article has been called an exaggeration by historians, yet there is evidence that the British were 
                                                          
25 Prelinger, “Prisoners,” 277-280. 
 
26  John Paul Jones “To Benjamin Franklin from John Paul Jones, 11 October, 1779,” The Papers 
of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 30, July 1 through October 31, 1779 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 520-521.  
 
27 Franklin, “Supplement,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 184-196. 
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guilty of the allegations Franklin identifies. Though Franklin’s article was indeed a fabrication 
and neither Jones nor Gerrish were the authors of the two letters, the political messages within 
the correspondence are worthy of examination and validation.  
Franklin, to his peers, did not acknowledge his authorship of the bogus article yet made a 
point to send his fellow peace commissioners as well as his friend and British colleague James 
Hutton, a copy of the article. To John Adams Franklin stated, “I send enclosed a Paper, of the 
Veracity of which I have some doubt, as to the Form, but none as to the Substance,” Franklin 
went on to say that he believed the atrocities listed in the article were mild in comparison to the 
violence executed by the British and their Indian allies. He hoped the article would be 
reproduced in England to prick the guilty consciences of those who read it. Franklin did not 
admit to producing the article himself to Adams and while Adams acknowledged receiving the 
letter, he never commented on the contents of the article itself. 28 
In a letter to John Jay, Franklin expressed the same sentiment, “I inclose what I suspect to 
be a pretended American Paper, which, however, tho’ it should be found fictitious as to 
the Form, is undoubtedly true as to the Substance. For The English cannot deny such a Number 
of Murders having been really committed by their Instigation.” Franklin questioned, as he did 
with his letter to Adams, the legitimacy of the article, acknowledging that the accounts were 
extreme but then reaffirmed his belief that the basis for its accusations were true.29 There is no 
record of Jay’s receiving the letter or his response to its accusations. 
                                                          
28 Franklin, “To John Adams, 22 April, 1782,” The Papers of John Adams, 447-448.  
 
29 Benjamin Franklin, “From Benjamin Franklin to John Jay, 24 April 1782,” The Papers of 
Benjamin Franklin, vol. 37, March 16 through August 15, 1782, ed. Ellen Cohn (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2003), 205-207. 
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To James Hutton in July of 1782, Franklin sent his “Supplement” with the same 
summary, though without acknowledgement of its authorship. In the letter, Franklin railed 
against the injustices promoted by King George “who happens to love Blood, and to hate 
Americans; been permitted to gratify that bad Temper.” Franklin described the massacres 
committee in the name of the king by British and Indians over “defenseless” civilians. In 
Franklin’s words, King George ignored the plight of his own citizens while he “enjoys all the 
good Things this World can afford, and is surrounded by Flatterers, who keep even his 
Conscience quiet, by telling him he is the best of Princes!”30 Hutton responded with an 
acknowledgment of the many atrocities committed by the British but also provided a rebuttal of 
the sordid descriptions the “Supplement” portrayed. Hutton argued, “That article in the Boston 
Paper must be Romance. All of it Invention, cruel forgery I hope & believe. Bales of Scalps!!! 
Neither the [King] nor his old ministers . . . are capable of such atrocities.”31 Franklin seemed to 
understand that his article was risky in its claims but believed in its implications enough to 
circulate it. As usual for Franklin’s rebukes, Franklin chose to remain cleverly anonymous but 
not adamantly secretive.32 
Although the fame of Franklin’s hoax has been briefly incorporated into Revolutionary 
discussions since the nineteenth century, only a few historians, most notably during the twenty-
                                                          
30 Benjamin Franklin, “From Benjamin Franklin to James Hutton 7 July, 1782,” The Papers of 
Benjamin Franklin, vol. 37, March 16 through August 15, 1782, ed. Ellen R. Cohn (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2003), 586-588. 
  
31 Benjamin Franklin, “From Benjamin Franklin to James Hutton 23 July, 1782,” The Papers of 
Benjamin Franklin, vol. 37, March 16 through August 15, 1782, ed. Ellen R. Cohn (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2003), 586-588.  
 
32 The editors of the Franklin Papers reveal that Franklin included a few special font types that 
would have alluded to his authorship. The Jones’ letter contained an italic font used only by the press at 
Passy, a font that a perceptive printer would have recognized as foreign to the original publication of the 
Boston Independent Chronicle. Franklin, “Supplement,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 184-196. 
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first century, have attempted to examine the details of Franklin’s most articulate deception and 
evaluate it for the authenticity of its claims and the margins of its political implications. The 
historiography of Franklin’s “Supplement” is not as well developed as that of his other famous 
works, yet the “Supplement” has existed in historical record since shortly after its publication. 
Still, the article has not always been recognized for the deception that it was. Not until the mid-
nineteenth century was there definitive expression that Franklin was the author of the 
“Supplement” and that the article was indeed a fabrication published by Franklin for political 
reasons. A New Jersey newspaper acknowledged the article as bogus in the 1850s.33  Jared 
Sparks’ multivolume publication in 1844 describes the “Supplement” as a “fictitious article.” 
Though Sparks states that Franklin’s article was published for no other reason than to “merely to 
amuse the author and his private friends,”34 Sparks acknowledges that Franklin’s desire was to 
enlighten British readers to their government’s conduct against Americans; however, Sparks 
ends his analysis here. There is no examination of Franklin’s political motives for the article or 
his frustration with British military and government practices.  
Nineteenth century scholarship on Franklin’s “Supplement” maintains the general trend 
portrayed by Sparks. Only brief references to the article are made throughout historical 
scholarship, and there is little analysis of the impact or implications of the article.  In 1896, John 
Bach McMaster gives a short summary of the “Supplement” in his work Benjamin Franklin a 
                                                          
33 Carla, Mulford, “Savage Eloquence,” 518. 
 
34 Jared Sparks, ed., The Works of Benjamin Franklin: Containing Several Political and 
Historical Tracts Not Including in Any Former Edition and Many Letters Official and Private Not 
Hitherto Published with Notes and a Life of the Author, vol. 5 (Boston: Whitemore, Niles, and Hall, 
1844), 125. 
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Man of Letters, yet this summary is nothing more than declaration of the article’s existence as 
one of Franklin’s hoaxes with a concise description of the article’s convincing authenticity.35   
Not until the twentieth century did greater discussion emerge concerning the events that 
provoked Franklin to write the article or even the techniques Franklin used to master his 
deception. In 1914, Luther S. Livingston published his comprehensive volume Franklin and His 
Press at Passy: The Books Pamphlets, and Leaflets Printed There, Including the Long-Lost 
‘Bagatelles’. Though this resource is primarily a compilation of Franklin’s own work, Livingston 
offers commentary on Franklin’s publications and the deception of his article as well as analysis 
on Franklin’s intentions for publishing the “Supplement.”  
Livingston’s analysis offers one of the first definitive examinations of the details and 
reasons for the publication of the “Supplement,” including descriptions of Franklin’s intentions 
for enumerating a list of Indian atrocities. Livingston includes Franklin’s letters to John Adams 
and Charles Dumas in order to provide context for Franklin’s publication and offer support for 
his grievances against Britain. Livingston ascertains that Franklin was greatly disturbed by 
British use of Indian warriors to kill civilians, actions which eventually provoked him to write 
the “Supplement.” Livingston alludes to the argument that Franklin wished for those in Britain to 
read his “Supplement” and respond accordingly although there is no profound discussion of this 
topic within the work.36 Though Livingston never expressly declares that Franklin’s intentions 
were to persuade the British people of their government’s indiscretions, Livingston claims the 
                                                          
35 John Bach MacMaster, Benjamin Franklin as a Man of Letters (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1896), 239. 
 
36 Luther Samuel Livingston, Franklin and His Press at Passy: The Books Pamphlets, and 
Leaflets Printed There, Including the Long-Lost ‘Bagatelles’, (New York: The Grolier Club, 1914), 64. 
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article was published and “circulated with a political purpose”; however, Livingston never really 
clearly defines this purpose. 37 
In 1961, Carl Berger published his volume on Revolutionary propaganda Broadsides and 
Bayonets: The Propaganda War of the American Revolution, a work which defines the concept 
of propaganda as “’any organized or concerted group effort or movement to spread particular 
doctrines, information, etc.’”38 This is a different definition than the traditional, negative 
connotation of propaganda which alludes to the dispersal of misinformation in order to 
manipulate or persuade. Berger explains the reason Franklin published his article or “black 
propaganda” (information published under the name of someone other than the true author)39 
was to “stir public opinion against Britain during the peace talks, in hopes of gaining 
concessions.”40 Berger argues that the “Supplement” was printed in conjunction with additional 
propaganda material in order to influence British public opinion and steer the course of the war. 
Franklin was intentional with his publication and articulated his convictions by subtly interlacing 
fact and fiction.41  
No other definitive analysis exists from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on 
Franklin’s “Supplement.” Though there are a few works which weave the context of Franklin’s 
piece into biographical sketches or narratives and discuss colonial and early American 
perceptions following the Revolution, there is no work which specifically examines or analyzes 
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the “Supplement” entirely until the twenty-first century. Carla Mulford, an English professor at 
Penn State, began publishing her scholarship on Franklin ten years ago, providing much needed 
analysis on Franklin’s famous deception. Mulford’s first work “Benjamin Franklin’s Savage 
Eloquence: Hoaxes from the Press at Passy, 1782” was published by the American Philosophical 
Society in 2008 and is one of the broadest analyses of Franklin’s “Supplement” to-date. 
Mulford’s work describes the lack of scholarship on Franklin’s article while providing important 
research on its publication and circulation following the American Revolution. Mulford’s 
invaluable examination not only lists the newspapers and periodicals which printed Franklin’s 
article as an authentic issue of the Boston Independent Chronicle but also includes an 
explanation of how the article increased in fame and circulation as the Revolution came to a 
close and tensions between America and Britain intensified until the outbreak of the War of 
1812.42 Mulford’s historiography explains that many newspapers and other commentary sources 
published the article as proof of Indian atrocities and in defense of Indian expulsion. Mulford 
remarks, “The metaphysics of Indian hating in the nineteenth century required repeated accounts 
of atrocities by Indians rather than reasonable argument  about the problem of the reservation 
system, fair trade with Indians, and preservation of Indian lifeways, all topics that Franklin 
himself had remarked on in his own day.”43 Essentially, Franklin’s “Supplement,” though 
originally intended to call out British misconduct against the colonies by exploiting the Indians 
became an example for Indian brutality and justification for Indian repression.44  
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Mulford’s examination is primarily dominated by a literary interpretation of the 
significance of Franklin’s work. This is not to say that Mulford does not provide important 
historical background and evaluation of the source, yet Mulford fails to analyze the authenticity 
of Franklin’s claims based on descriptions and accounts of British exploitation of Indian warriors 
against American civilians or the claims of piracy against the British. Franklin’s article was 
fabricated information, yet Franklin based his claims on authentic events. Mulford offers a minor 
analysis of the political context of Franklin’s article based on Franklin’s opinion toward the 
British as well as a preliminary evaluation of Franklin’s intentions to influence peace 
negotiations between American and the British. 
In her work, Benjamin Franklin and the Ends of Empire published in 2015, Mulford 
gives broader explanation to the reasons for Franklin’s publication, including the political 
objectives behind his frustrations. In her narrative, Mulford briefly examines the purpose of 
British use of Indians against Americans during the Revolution, concluding that “in the context 
of Franklin’s peace negotiations and his other writings on the problems with the British ministry, 
the hoax is not really about the Iroquois so much as it is about British atrocities against their own 
countrypeople.”45 This is an important assertion on Franklin’s “Supplement” and one that is not 
found in nineteenth or twentieth-century scholarship. Though the implication of this conclusion 
is supported by previous research, Mulford compiles the information known about the 
“Supplement” and Franklin’s intentions and reveals the importance of the “Supplement” to the 
American Revolutionary narrative.  
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Mulford also discusses Franklin’s connection to American prisoners of war and his desire 
to see these prisoners exchanged or liberated, particularly naval prisoners whom Britain had 
mistreated and conscripted into service. Mulford details Franklin’s relationship with John Paul 
Jones in reference to the Jones’ letter, analyzing Franklin’s use of sarcasm, irony, and mockery 
throughout the letter in order to convey his point that Britain was misusing her power against her 
own citizens.46  
Some of the most recent research to examine Franklin’s “Supplement” is found in 
Gregory Evans Dowd’s book Groundless: Rumors, Legends, and Hoaxes on the Early American 
Frontier (2015), a work which analyzes the deceptions and fallacies of early America that helped 
shape culture and society within the young colony and nation. Dowd explains that by the War of 
1812, the article achieved rejuvenated interest and contributed to reigniting American bitterness 
toward British Revolutionary violence.47 Dowd’s work largely pulls from Mulford’s research 
though his scholarship offers a synopsis of Franklin’s association with the Indian issues of the 
day, focusing largely on Franklin’s goals to influence negotiations between Britain and America 
in relation to these concerns. Dowd emphasizes Franklin’s fabrication of the article, particularly 
in context to the scalping accounts but offers little discussion of the events which prompted 
Franklin to write about the Indian massacres. Dowd’s work analyzes some of the speculative 
reasons behind Franklin’s publication of the “Supplement,” arguing that Franklin took advantage 
of some of the worst, most shocking stories of the war and attempted to spark conversation and 
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even speculation on the subjects he wished to address through peace negotiations.48 Dowd’s 
analysis also extends to the publication of the article in both America and England and examines 
the article’s influence beyond the Revolution. 
Franklin’s “Supplement” has received greater scholarly attention in recent years; 
however, there lacks discussion on the authenticity of Franklin’s claims of British misconduct as 
well as an examination of how the “Supplement” fits into Franklin’s political views. Franklin’s 
declarations are assumed to be exaggerated, yet historians have recognized that there are 
elements of truth to his assertions. In order to assess the validity of Franklin’s implications, there 
must be analysis of Franklin’s claims against the British regarding both the use of Indian force 
against the American colonies and the American prisoner of war situation. There must also be an 
assessment of the extent the “Supplement” summarizes Franklin’s political opinions since the 
article was composed in reference to peace negotiations. For the first letter of the “Supplement,” 
Franklin expressed his belief that the British exploited the Indians against the colonies, forcing 
the Indians, or at least allowing the Indians, to commit gruesome crimes against civilians who 
were technically still British citizens. According to Franklin, the Indians were indebted to the 
British for supplies; the British knew this and exploited them for it. 
As for the claims of the second letter, Britain was reluctant to exchange American 
prisoners with their own, often mistreating and abusing these men and sometimes even coercing 
American soldiers into service to the British army. To Franklin, these actions were reprehensible 
and unfitting of a civilized nation. Franklin had worked for several years to try to rectify this 
issue and encourage the British into some kind of trade of prisoners, but with little avail. He even 
secured the help of John Paul Jones in order to compel the British to rectify the situation, yet the 
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outcome proved less than desirable. Through the Jones’ letter, Franklin conveyed not only the 
bitterness and frustration toward British authorities he had carried for many years for their lack 
of cooperation, but also expressed his motivations for influencing peace negotiations between 
America and Britain. 
Franklin’s accusations regarding British brutality against the American colonies do not 
seem too outrageous after examination of British military practices during the Revolution. 
Historical scholarship supports the argument that Britain was not above using violent methods to 
subdue insubordinate populations. Historiography is varied on how British use of Indian 
manpower fit into American Revolutionary experiences. Early discussion of British use of Indian 
tribes against the American colonies reflects the various attitudes toward Indian tribes during the 
nineteenth century. These include arguments that maintain that American atrocities against 
native tribes rivaled Indian attacks on American settlers such as described in the work of William 
Stone’s Life of Joseph Brant, published in 1851.  
Other authors such as Andrew MacFarland Davis in his 1887 article “The Employment of 
Indian Auxiliaries in the American War” address the lack of British supervision over Indian 
recruits which led to many of the recorded atrocities against American soldiers and civilians. 
Davis argues that no matter the reason for the British employing Indians or despite the fact that 
Americans employed Indians as well, the British were still responsible for the actions of the 
Indians against American civilians.49 Historian Francis Halsey Whiting in his work The Old New 
York Frontier published in 1902 uses state archives and government records to analyze Indian 
violence against American civilians in the Revolution while later historians such as James Axtell 
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and William Sturtevant writing in the 1980s challenge traditional scholarship on Indian brutality 
in the American Revolution by tracing the history of the gruesome native practices. 
Authors such as Colin Calloway in his work The American Revolution in Indian Country: 
Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities published in 1995 offer an expansive 
interpretation of how the Revolution affected Native Americans at every level of their society in 
relation to their relationships with both sides in the war. Calloway also includes information on 
how the Indians responded to the various associations they encountered with white men 
throughout this experience. Likewise, Wayne E. Lee, in his work Barbarians and Brothers: 
Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865 (2014), discusses Indian-colonial relations but also delves 
deeper into the social and cultural differences between these two groups and the causes of the 
initial conflicts between the white settlers and the natives. Lee analyzes how these populations 
worked to either resolve their differences on some occasions or remain in direct opposition to 
one another in most instances. 
Franklin’s “Supplement” promoted the argument that the British government was in 
violation of moral principles and legal obligations toward the American colonies. Stephen 
Conway’s article “To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the 
Revolutionary War” analyzes the conduct of British army officers during the Revolutionary War 
toward both enemy soldiers and civilians. Not all British officers and soldiers were inclined to 
Franklin’s generalizations even though there is enough evidence to argue that Franklin’s claims 
were not simply based on rumors. Holger Hoock’s recent work Scars of Independence: 
America’s Violent Birth (2017) offers an examination of the ferocity and brutality of the 
Revolution, defining the offenders and casualties of the war. Rather than focus on the 
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compromises and triumphs of the war, Hoock addresses the hostility that is often overlooked in 
historical scholarship and which characterizes the accusations in Franklin’s “Supplement.” 
 Franklin’s purpose for publishing the “Supplement” rested primarily on informing his 
readers of what he believed was the British government’s endorsement of barbaric military 
standards against Americans. Franklin’s intentions were not merely to inform, but to politically 
engage his audience against British policy. Though proof that Franklin affected peace 
negotiations with the “Supplement” is not expressly evident, Franklin influenced the final 
discussions between Britain and America at the close of the war. Jonathan Dull, a historian who 
has spent much of his career studying Franklin and editing Franklin’s papers and essays, 
examines in his recent work Benjamin Franklin and the American Revolution (2010) Franklin’s 
position as an agent of opposition against the British and a minimizer of anti-Americanism. Dull 
specifically discusses Franklin’s use of print to convey his opinions since Franklin’s personality 
lent itself to only indirect opposition rather than open confrontation.50 In an earlier work of 
Dull’s, “Franklin the Diplomat: The French Mission” published in 1982, Dull examines 
Franklin’s diplomatic role within the American Revolution, including Franklin’s propaganda 
publications. He argues that Franklin had a distaste of the British which prompted him to write 
and publish things that reflected this animosity; however, Dull fails to include discussion on 
Franklin’s “Supplement” in his work despite his analysis of Franklin’s propaganda publication.51 
Franklin wished to portray the irrationality of the British through his publication and 
hoped to enlighten the British public to what he perceived as barbarianism promoted by its 
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government and military. The press, as Franklin well knew, provided a convenient opportunity to 
sway public opinion.  Solomon Lutnick’s work, The American Revolution and the British Press, 
1775-1783 (1967) provides one of the first comprehensive analyses of the British press during 
the Revolution. Examining the role of the press on public opinion and its influence on political 
perception, Lutnick’s focuses on how the British public perceived the war by way of the press 
and offers some discussion on Franklin’s relationship with British newspapers. Barton E. Price’s 
work Making Headlines: The American Revolution as Seen through the British Press (2009) 
analyzes the role of newspapers and other public channels within Great Britain during the 
Revolution, examining how the war was received within Britain while describing British reaction 
to controversial topics such as the use of Indians against Americans. Overall, reception of the 
war was mixed although some British citizens overwhelmingly supported American 
independence.  
The scholarship surrounding the “Supplement” remains largely constricted to literary 
analyses and limited to discussions of propaganda history; the historical investigation of 
Franklin’s “Supplement,” including the reasons for its publication, the authenticity of its 
allegations, and the effect of its political suggestions have been generally neglected. The article 
has been evaluated as a reflection of Franklin’s attitude toward British political dealings with the 
colonies, but there is little evaluation of the authenticity of Franklin’s claims on British military 
and government misconduct.  The circulation and publication of the article in America and 
Britain has been investigated, but there is minimal analysis on the political ideas which prompted 
Franklin to publish the “Supplement.”  Franklin used the “Supplement” as an expression of his 
frustration in an attempt to uncover to those ignorant of the atrocities what he felt was duplicity 
within British government and barbarianism displayed by their military.  
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This chapter has introduced the “Supplement” as an important expression of Franklin’s 
ideas and opinions on British conduct and American peace and evaluated the presence of the 
“Supplement” in historical scholarship. The second chapter of this project will critically assess 
the first letter of Franklin’s “Supplement,” evaluating the events which prompted Franklin to 
write the article and reviewing British and American responses to British conduct in addition to 
Franklin’s own reaction. The third chapter will provide a detailed discussion of the second letter 
of Franklin’s “Supplement” and review the political instigations for his reactions to British 
claims of piracy as well as an assessment of the experiences of American prisoners of war. The 
fourth chapter will examine Franklin’s role in peace negotiations between America and Britain, 
providing context for Franklin’s outcry against British conduct during the war and establishing 
the “Supplement” as a summation of Franklin’s grievances against Parliament and the Crown. 
The fifth chapter will summarize this research and reassert the position that the “Supplement” 
holds a position among Franklin’s most important works due to its political significance as a 
summary of Franklin’s ideas on British political policy and a testament of his opinions on peace 
negotiations between America and Britain. 
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Chapter 2 
The Gerrish Letter: A Rebuke of British Policy  
Franklin published the “Supplement” to express his political opinions in a typical literary 
fashion and reveal to the public the hypocrisy of British colonial policy. The first half of 
Franklin’s “Supplement” examined an important issue not only for Franklin, but many 
Americans – British use of Indian force against American civilians. Despite Franklin’s 
exaggeration of British and Indian atrocity throughout the first letter of the “Supplement,” 
Franklin based his hyperbole on genuine encounters between colonial and Indian forces. There 
was a general lack of restraint within British regiments in charge of Indian forces, infuriating not 
only Franklin but numerous Americans. The slackness in British military authority gave Indian 
warriors free-reign in assaults against American settlements which often resulted in damage to 
civilian homes and livestock. Sometimes, Indian raids ended in the capture or slaying of both 
soldiers and civilians, provoking outcry from British and American citizens alike. Franklin 
mocked Parliament’s indifference to these atrocities throughout the first section of the 
“Supplement” by describing appalling yet embellished stories of Indian raids where dozens of 
the scalps of soldiers and settlers were captured through gruesome attack and torture. Franklin 
also expressed his resentment toward British management of its colonial holdings and native 
populations as well British political designs toward the American colonies, reiterating opinions 
he had possessed before the Revolution began. Franklin’s descriptions were shocking and 
extravagant by any standard, but his point was clear: There was blood on British hands, 
Parliament’s and King George’s hands chiefly.52  
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Franklin was not the only American who believed that Parliament and the king were 
responsible for violence against the colonists. Influential officials from Congress agreed with 
many of Franklin’s points. Though Franklin’s descriptions were exaggerated, the motives for his 
protest were reasonable. Iroquoian forces had conducted raids against colonial settlements in 
Pennsylvania and New York throughout 1778, prompting outcry and retaliation from American 
civilians and officials in vengeful assaults against Indian settlements. Indian tribes responded to 
this retaliation in a brutal attack against the American Fort Alden in Cherry Valley, New York 
where an Indian force led by Joseph Brant, Indian chief of the Mohawk Indian tribe, burned 
white settlers’ property and murdered civilians. Unable to contain the Indian force, the British 
received great backlash from the incident in addition to extensive criticism against their military 
conduct in the war and treatment of American colonists, only supplying Franklin with additional 
evidence of British misconduct and providing motive for the points of Franklin’s “Supplement” 
in its protest of the unseemly British policies. 
 In negotiations for peace between America and Britain, Franklin expressed his desire for 
the British to acknowledge their offenses so that both nations could arrive at a mutual political 
understanding for peace. To David Hartley, in the same month Franklin published the 
“Supplement,” Franklin wrote, “When you consider the Injustice of your War with us, and the 
barbarous manner in which it has been carried on, the many suffering Families among us from 
your Burnings of Towns Scalpings by Savages &c. &c. will it not appear to you, that tho’ a 
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Cessation of the War may be a Peace, it may not be a Reconciliation?”53 Franklin intended to 
portray, rather explicitly, the atrocities he and his fellow Americans had witnessed throughout 
the war. The “Supplement” provided Franklin an avenue by which he could not only vent his 
frustrations regarding British policy but also summarize his life’s work in the development of the 
political opinions that opposed British imperial expansion and encouraged resolution to the 
American war.  
Franklin began the first section of his “Supplement” with an unassuming title and a date 
of publication, “Numb. 705 Supplement to the Boston Independent Chronicle. Boston March 
12.”54 Franklin’s intentions were to have the article appear as an addition to the Boston 
newspaper with authentic type press, advertisements, and credible content. The first portion of 
the article began with the introduction, “Extract of a Letter from Capt. Gerrish, of the New-
England Militia, dated Albany, March 7.”55 Following this introduction, Franklin described the 
disturbing contents of the letter Captain Gerrish had acquired. Gerrish’s regiment had not only 
attained a healthy supply of goods and materials but also packages of American scalps secured 
by the Seneca Indians. These scalps were supposedly in route “as a Present to Co. Haldimand, 
Governor of Canada,”56 meant for the king’s inspection. An enclosed letter accompanying the 
scalps read, “At the Request of the Senneka Chiefs I send herewith to your Excellency, under the 
Care of James Boyd, eight Packs of Scalps, cured, dried, hooped, and painted, with all the Indian 
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triumphal Marks, of which the following is Invoice and Explanation.”57 Franklin painted a vivid 
picture with his opening remarks, working to reveal his disdain for British military policy in the 
first few sections of his “Supplement.” The scalps obtained by Gerrish were in route to England 
as victory trophies of British accomplishments and military achievement. The idea that such 
atrocity would be condoned by the British government or even celebrated reveals the depth of 
Franklin’s disdain. Franklin’s ultimate goal in producing the “Supplement” was to uncover the 
hypocrisy of Britain’s political and military practice toward America and in doing so, affect 
peace between the two nations.   
The first detail Franklin included in the record of Indian assaults were descriptions of the 
soldiers’ scalps and details on how they were obtained. The letter stated that amidst the 
confiscated bounty were bags “containing 43 Scalps of Congress Soldiers killed in different 
Skirmishes; these are stretched on black Hoops, 4 inches diameter; the inside of the Skin painted 
red, with a small black Spot to note their being killed with Bullets.”58 Though alarming, the 
death of soldiers was not quite as disturbing as the subsequent accounts Franklin provided of the 
hundreds of civilian scalps packed and ready to be shipped. Franklin’s explanations included 
details on how the victims died and where they were attacked. The political messages behind 
these descriptions would not have been lost on any observant reader. The civilians were those 
who Franklin and many others in colonial culture considered the most defenseless and innocent 
of society (women, children, clergy). Not only were these people killed without opportunity for 
defense but attacked in a gruesome manner, tortured, and maimed in Franklin’s descriptions. A 
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sample of the civilian deaths suffered at the hands of the Indians included “62 of Farmers, killed 
in their houses; . . .surprised in the Night, and a black Hatchet in the Middle, signifying their 
being killed with that Weapon.”59 Subsequent descriptions continued in gory detail.  
Among the dead were ministers both young and old, women with “hair long, braided in 
the Indian Fashion, to shew they were Mothers,” and children and babies “ript out of their 
Mothers’ Bellies.”60 Though the descriptions are obviously Franklin’s own embellishment, these 
summaries reveal several things about Franklin’s own ideas regarding British military policy as 
well as the political climate between America and Britain as the two nations approached peace 
negotiations. Franklin’s disdain for the British was deeply rooted in his distaste for their 
contradictory policies and violent military conduct. In language that conveys Franklin’s 
embittered resentment toward the Crown and Parliament for their betrayal of civilized war 
standards and abandonment of imperial loyalty, the “Supplement” represented the realities of the 
Revolution and a sentiment expressed most vehemently by Franklin but also by many 
Americans. Indeed, the “Supplement” reflected the claims of the Declaration penned six years 
earlier at the initiation of the conflict. Though perhaps not as eloquently or tastefully as those 
words penned by Thomas Jefferson, Franklin’s rebuke was just as clear as that of the Continental 
Congress in July 1776. King George represented all that Congress and Franklin despised with 
British policy. In the Declaration, the Founders accused, “He has plundered our seas, ravaged our 
Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.”61 Descriptions of the Indian 
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uprisings the British provoked against the colonists mirrored the implied complaints of the 
“Supplement,”  “He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to 
bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of 
warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.”62 Franklin’s 
“Supplement” summarized not only Franklin’s own political opinions but also the primary issues 
of the Revolution and the peace negotiation process. In 1779, three years following the signing 
of the Declaration but several years before Franklin published his “Supplement,” Franklin, John 
Adams, and Arthur Lee penned a letter to Comte de Vergennes of France in the First Joint 
Commission at Paris, expressing concerns on British policies and conduct very similar to the 
message of Franklin’s “Supplement”: “They have already burnt the beautiful Towns . . . [and] . . 
. innumerable single Buildings and smaller Clusters of Houses, wherever their Armies have 
march’d. They have also done their utmost in seducing Negroes and Indians to commit inhuman 
Butcheries upon the Inhabitants sparing neither Age, Sex, nor Character.” The commission went 
as far as to complain about the treatment of American prisoners of war as well, “They have thurst 
their Prisoners into such Dungeons, loaded them with Irons, and exposed them to such lingering 
Torments, of Cold, Hunger and Disease, as have destroyed greater Numbers, than they could 
have had an Opportunity of murdering,”63 a topic Franklin addressed in the second letter of the 
“Supplement.” 
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In the same year Franklin, Adams, and Lee wrote to Vergennes, Franklin was 
commissioned by Congress to gather a compilation of British crimes against America in an effort 
to unite the colonies against British tyranny and provoke sympathy from British civilians. This 
collection included descriptions and illustrations of the violence the British promoted with their 
political policies and military campaigns. Franklin wrote to David Hartley, an English politician 
and friend of Franklin, in 1780 concerning the directive, “Every kindness I hear of done by an 
Englishman to an american Prisoner makes me resolve not to proceed in the Work, hoping a 
Reconciliation may yet take place. But every fresh Instance of your Devilism weakens that 
resolution, and makes me abominate the Thought of Reunion with such a People.”64 Franklin 
could not ignore the consistent hostility of British forces and allies toward American colonists. 
Though there are no specific records which authenticate Franklin’s claims to mother’s 
having their babies “ript” from their wombs or clergymen axed to pieces by Indian warriors, 
there were numerous accounts of Indian assaults which resulted in the burning of civilian homes, 
killing of women and children, and unnecessary torture of soldiers all while under the authority 
of the British military. The year 1778 brought a string of Indian raids against colonial settlements 
in Pennsylvania and New York, prompting outcry and retaliation from American civilians and 
officials. The Indians responded to this retaliation in an attack against the American Fort Alden 
in Cherry Valley, New York where an Indian force led by Joseph Brant, Indian chief of the 
Mohawk Indian tribe burned property and murdered civilians. Unable to contain the Indian force, 
the British received great backlash from the incident in addition to extensive criticism on their 
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military conduct in the war and treatment of American colonists, only supplying Franklin with 
additional evidence of British indifference and providing motive for the points of Franklin’s 
“Supplement” and its protest against British policy. 
Despite the lack of supervision on the conduct of Indian forces, Indian hostility most 
often occurred in opposition to British commands.  The British were not entirely calloused to 
American appeals for protection; however, there were only minimal attempts to quell the 
reckless behavior for which Indian forces were known. The British, especially British officers, 
did not usually condone Indian violence or brutality, though this was not often advertised to the 
American public.65  However, in context to Franklin’s claims in the “Supplement,” many times 
the British were simply unable to contain Indian warriors once their attacks began. This was the 
pinnacle of Franklin’s frustration. Regardless of good intentions by any of Britain’s soldiers or 
officers, British policy allowed for the use of Indian force against the colonists and did little 
more than verbally warn the Indians to avoid violence. The year 1778 brought several assaults on 
American civilians that neither Franklin nor the American public could ignore.  
By the late 1770s, the effects of the Revolution could be observed throughout the entirety 
of the American colonies. While the Continental Army and British forces waged war in the 
southern colonies and eastern seaboard, British Major General John Butler was commissioned to 
undermine American forces on the frontier and throughout New York and Pennsylvania. 
Mohawk Indian chief Joseph Brant was paired with Butler and commissioned to attack forces 
and settlements in the north, around New York and Pennsylvania. Tensions ran high among 
colonists there due to decades of unrest between Indian tribes and white settlers and incoming 
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European groups; this dynamic created a hazardous situation for British troops. Sometimes white 
settlers were inclined to exaggerate any raid against their settlements as Indian tribes periodically 
sought revenge on settlers under the guise of military attack. The relationship between the two 
groups remained less than cordial into the Revolution.66  
 Although Indian attacks were nothing new by the time of the Revolution, they became 
the subject of Revolutionary propaganda and cause of public hysteria as the war progressed. 
Historian Holger Hoock argues that Indian aggression would have been “less shocking to 
Americans on the frontier who had long since become habituated to unlimited warfare,” but 
Indian violence had been an issue for Americans living in cities and villages since the beginning 
of the war and would have been particularly egregious to those not accustomed to persistent 
conflict.67 As the war progressed so did the intensity of the conflict between frontier Americans 
and Indian forces commissioned by the British. Though initial Indian attacks were usually no 
more shocking than earlier skirmishes between American settlers and Indian tribes, by the end of 
1778, Indian aggression against American civilians intensified. Tragic accounts exaggerated by 
newspapers in the beginning of 1778 evolved into authentic stories of plunder and destruction by 
the end of the year. 
In July 1778, Butler and Brant led an attack on the Wyoming Valley, now present day 
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, which resulted in the capture of a Continental Army militia. The 
battle did not end with the defeat of the American forces, however; and Indians attacked settlers’ 
homes and land holdings following the battle. Many patriot dwellings and a great amount of 
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property were completely destroyed by the Indians Butler was unable to contain. Rumors spread 
throughout the colonies, exaggerating the attack despite the lack of civilian deaths. Those 
soldiers captured by the Indians were imprisoned and tortured which further contributed to 
growing fears and frustration toward the British.68   
In late September 1778, Americans received some retribution for the Indian attacks made 
against them. Colonel Thomas Hartley and Colonel William Butler of the Continental Army 
combined their forces against the Indian settlements at Oquaga and Tioga in New York in 
retaliation against the attacks against Wyoming and other settlements. Though the assaults at 
Oquaga and Tioga were not overwhelming victories for the Americans, they did result in the 
destruction of the Indian property and the death of several dozen natives. This outcome worked 
to further incite the Indians against Americans and became the justification for the notorious 
Cherry Valley Massacre.69 
In fall of 1778 clashes between Indian and American forces persisted, although one 
incident proved irreparably damaging to British and Indian reputations. Following the raid on 
Wyoming Valley in the summer of 1778, Butler and Brant continued their string of attacks in the 
North along New York and Pennsylvania, plundering and pillaging villages and settlements 
while taking prisoners of civilians and soldiers. In early fall, as British forces approached Forts 
Dayton and Herkimer near German Flatts, a settlement in northern New York, the Indian and 
British forces demolished the entire area of homes and property. By November, despite Butler 
and Brant’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties, their forces had destroyed enough of the 
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settlements to raise public anxiety and frustrate American forces.70 Historian Max Mintz explains 
that despite American efforts to secure the vulnerable settlements in Brant’s path, “attacks by 
bands of Indians on men in the fields and women and children in their homes were so 
widespread that there was no safety outside of the forts.”71 
By early November 1778, the British were in position to attack Fort Alden in Cherry 
Valley, a settlement of several hundred inhabitants as well as dozens of officers and soldiers who 
occupied the fort. This attack was in part planned by Indian leaders as an act of revenge in 
response to the American attack at Tioga and Oquaga. Unfortunately for American forces, the 
American commanders and soldiers of Fort Alden were not only untrained but also unprepared 
for a surprise Indian attack. The initial strike on the outskirts of the settlement resulted in the 
capture of several officers and the death of almost two dozen soldiers as well as several 
casualties of women and children. The British and Indian forces were unable to infiltrate the Fort 
but did not stop their tirade at this offensive. The Indian force raided the surrounding settlement, 
violently killing civilians while destroying homes and property.72 
Captain Benjamin Warren, American officer present at Fort Alden during the attack, 
recalled the gruesome events which unfolded as the Indians concluded their assault on the 
settlement: 
In the afternoon and morning of the 13th we sent out parties after the enemy withdrew; 
brought in the dead; such a shocking sight my eyes never beheld before of savage and 
brutal barbarity; to see the husband mourning over his dead wife with four dead children 
lying by her side, mangled, scalpt, and some their heads, some their legs and arms cut off, 
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some torn the flesh off their bones by their dogs-12 of one family killed and four of them 
burnt in his house.73 
 
As for the reasons for the assault, Joseph Brant reiterated his own frustrations as well as 
those of his people’s toward the American strike against Indian forces in Tioga and Oquaga, 
“You burned our houses, which makes us and our Brothers the Seneca Indians angrey, so that we 
Destroyed men, women, and Children at Chervalle [Cherry Valley].” Brant threatened, “We, 
therefore, Desire that you will Let our brothers live in peace, least ye be worst dealt with, then 
your Nighbours the Cheryvalle People was.”74 
 American response to Cherry Valley was as expected. The string of Indian attacks that 
had preceded Cherry Valley throughout 1778, though mild compared to the Cherry Valley 
incident, had only worked to incite disdain for the enemy. The scale of the Cherry Valley 
incident was not as grave as initially believed and even George Washington admitted to Henry 
Laurens by the end of November 1778 that “though the ravages at the Cherry Valley settlement 
were great in the late attack by the Savages, yet our loss was much less than we had reason to 
apprehend it from our former advices.”75 By false intelligence, the Americans had been under the 
impression that British and Indian forces were able to overtake Fort Alden and isolate the 
American force there.76 However, both the American military and the American public were 
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provoked beyond conciliation. Washington revealed to Henry Laurens regarding the Cherry 
Valley attack, “These depredations of the enemy give me the most serious concern—I lament 
that we have not yet had it in our power to give them an effectual check. I am perfectly 
convinced, that the only certain way of preventing Indian ravages is to carry the war vigorously 
into their own country.”77 
American newspapers recalled the event to the public, describing the violent scenes in 
graphic detail although some articles embellished the stories of assault and murder. A 
Pennsylvania publication recalled disturbingly, “The enemy killed, scalp, and most barbarously 
murdered 32 inhabitants, chiefly women and children. . . Robert Henderson head was cut off, his 
scull bone was cut out with the scalp - Mr. Willissister was ripup, a child of Mr. Willis 2 months 
old, scalp and arm cut off - the clergyman wife leg and arm cut off, and many others as cruelly 
treated.”78 
These attacks naturally sparked fear for future assault and contempt for British and Indian 
forces. Regardless of the exaggeration by the press, most civilian apprehension and distress was 
not unfounded. The British were not effective in quelling Indian hostility against civilian 
populations which was one of the primary points of Franklin’s article. “He [King George] 
engages savages to murder their defenceless farmers, women, and children,”79 Franklin bitterly 
                                                          
77 George Washington, “From George Washington To Henry Laurens, 16 November 1778,” The 
Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 18, 1 November 1778 – 14 January 1779, 
ed. Edward G. Lengel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 169-170.  
 
78 “Dec. 3. From an Officer Who Was in the Fort at Cherry Valley, Nov. 11th, When It Was 
Attacked, We Have the Following Accounts,” Pennsylvania Gazette, December 19, 1778, Accessible 
Archives, Accessed August 4, 2018. 
 
79 Franklin, “Supplement,” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 184-196. 
 
39 
 
remarked. Franklin rebuked the British and Indian attacks which had terrorized colonists into a 
perpetual state of panic. This violence, Franklin believed, deserved acknowledgement and 
apology by the British government before peace could be restored. 
In spite of Franklin’s protests against Indian violence, the British were not alone in their 
use of Indian force in the Revolution. Early into the war, America adopted a policy to use Indian 
force against the British. As early as June of 1776, the Second Continental Congress permitted 
George Washington to “employ. . .a number of Indians” for American defense.80 Though the 
British began the discussion of using Indian reinforcements as early as 1775, there was not 
extensive use of Indian support against America until 1777. Once the implementation process 
began, however, the British worked effectively to supplement their depleted regiments with 
Indian force to quell uprisings on the frontier. America, on the other hand, was slow in 
supplementing Indian force into colonial ranks and even slower in commissioning them on the 
battlefield. 81  
 Previous historians have argued that American use of Indian force against the British 
justified British manipulation of Indian warriors against American civilians. Nineteenth century 
historian Andrew Davis, however, argues that the British were not released from their obligation 
to acknowledge the atrocities committed by the Indians while under the charge of the British 
military simply because they were not the first military to use this type of force. The British were 
still accountable their use of Indian force in situations that allowed the warriors unsupervised 
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access to civilians. In these cases, the British should have more prudently designated Indian 
forces to regiments where British soldiers were the majority force. Allowing the Indians nearly 
full control over attacks created opportunities for unsavory outcomes. Davis contends that British 
use of Indian force greatly subjected American civilians to native attacks, although those Indians 
employed by the Americans primarily limited their assaults to British soldiers.82 “As allies of the 
American forces,” Davis asserts that the Indians “would have been able to vent their passions 
only on soldiers. Acting as auxiliaries of the English, the homes of hundreds of border settlers 
were exposed to their raids.”83 Despite Davis’s oversight to the Loyalists and Tories and other 
the Crown supporters who would have also been exposed to the Indian raids commissioned by 
the Americans, his points remain relevant. American efforts to use Indian force were far inferior 
to that of the British. Although Congress had petitioned for their place beside American soldiers, 
Indian support of British efforts far outweighed any use of Indian power by American regiments.  
By commissioning Indians to fight against American forces, the British assumed responsibility 
of any unbridled aggression. Since Britain possessed the advantage of greater support from 
native populations, she carried the weight of responsibility for their decorum.84  
More recent historians have maintained similar positions on the right of responsibility 
concerning Indian atrocity on the American frontier. Both American and British armies used 
Indian force against their opponents; however, the British were able to obtain the greater support 
from native tribes because of British willingness to provide economic benefits in exchange for 
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this loyalty. Unfortunately for the reputation of the British military and the welfare of American 
civilians, these Indian warriors acted in a way that often negatively affected American across the 
frontier and that was hard to contain by British officers.85 
The violent nature of Indian warfare had been an ongoing struggle for Europeans since 
the beginning of colonization of the New World. Scalping was a particularly heinous war ritual 
that disturbed white immigrants yet was used extensively among many native tribes as a signal 
of victory for Indian warriors following battles. The act of scalping was significant to many 
Indian cultures and engrained in their customs long before Europeans arrived in North America; 
scalps represented “trophies” for valiant efforts in conquest. Though Europeans had their own 
versions of violence and genocide they practiced against the Indians who occupied the land the 
Europeans laid claim to, scalping was unique to American indigenous populations.86 In the 
centuries and decades leading up to the Revolution, vicious fighting broke out among American 
colonists and Indian warriors. The Indians were responsible for many vicious raids against 
colonial settlers while settlers were, in turn, guilty of brutal offensive attacks against their Indian 
opponents. A primary crux in the American assertion of independence from Great Britain and a 
principal complaint of Franklin’s was the unchecked violence that the British government and 
military had negligently ignored.87 
At the heart of Franklin’s frustration lay not vexation with Indian hostility but a disgust 
with British efforts to not only ignore American requests for protection against native tribes but 
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also British endeavors to subdue the American rebellion with those Indian forces and castigate 
the colonists for attempts to assert their rights as Englishmen against such violence. Lieutenant 
governor of Fort Vincennes located near the present day Indiana-Illinois border, Edward Abbott, 
wrote in 1778 that the American colonists wished to “put themselves under His Majesty’s 
protection,” but also complained that the colonists were “forced to take up arms against” the king 
unwillingly.88 Though some colonists were surely more eager than Abbott described to throw off 
the constraints of British rule, the general consensus among most Americans was compromise 
before conflict. The act of pitting native populations against colonials in addition to the force of 
the British army infuriated most Americans but also created a universal sense of panic among 
civilian populations. Abbott summarized this fear with a reference to Indian violence, “It is not 
the people in arms that the Indians will ever daringly attack, but the poor inoffensive families 
who fly to the desserts to be put out of trouble, & who are inhumanly butchered sparing neither 
women or children.”89 
While American reactions to British use of Indian force were as expected, British public 
reaction was not entirely different from American protests. Troy Bickham in his work Making 
Headlines: The American Revolution as Seen through the British Press asserts that the British 
believed that the Americans, despite their rebellious state, remained a vital part of the British 
Empire. The British public believed that normal British behavior against international enemies 
would not be appropriate against American patriots, this included an expectation of humane 
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treatment for captives and the protection of American towns and villages. Unlike those British 
wars such as the French and Indian War, the British public largely believed that Americans 
deserved a higher standard of military conduct. Although Americans used their fair share of 
underhanded military tactics including their own use of Indian manpower, in the eyes of the 
British public and consequently the British press, it was the British military, not America who 
bore the brunt of criticism regarding the use of outside forces such as Indian populations and the 
maltreatment of American prisoners and civilians.90  
Bickman points out that based on evidence from reports of several British newspapers, 
the majority of the British believed that any British acts of violence would only promote hostility 
and American insurgence. Even the use of outsider groups like Indians and German Hessians 
against American forces bothered British readers as much as American patriots. Bickman 
remarks, “Complaints contained in the Declaration of Independence about these groups’ 
participation would have struck a chord with British readers. The means with which the British 
government waged the war in America clearly mattered to many Britons at home.”91 If the 
Declaration “struck a chord” then so did the “Supplement.” Franklin’s reiteration of the 
Declaration’s points revealed the root of the colonists’ problems with Britain during the 
Revolution, highlighting the lack of resolution to these issues.  
Another section of the Supplement and subsequent portion of the letter found by Gerrrish 
among the discovered Indian scalps included an explanation written by an Indian chief of why 
the scalps were packaged and ready for shipment. In this portion of the article, Franklin boldly 
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chastised King George and the British government for their endorsement and authorization of the 
atrocities committed against America. In rebuke of British use of Indian force against the 
colonies and their extortion of Indian dependence on British trade, Franklin satirized the callous 
nature of the king and the brutality of the British political position. “We wish you to send these 
Scalps over the Water to the great King,” the Indian chief announced, “that he may regard them 
and be refreshed; and that he may see our faithfulness in destroying his Enemies, and be 
convinced that his Presents have not been made to an ungrateful people.”92 Franklin exposed the 
nature of British intentions which sought to prey upon the neediness of native tribes and 
intimidate them to fight against America. Great Britain progressively alienated entire nations 
with her encroachment on lands and resources; Franklin recognized this trend with not only the 
American colonies but also native populations, “The great King’s Enemies are many, and they 
grow fast in Number. . . They have driven us out of our Country for taking Part in your Quarrel. 
We expect the great King will give us another Country, that our Children may live after us, and 
be his Friends and Children, as we are.”93 This was a false hope and impractical request, but not 
a ridiculous point for Franklin to make. The Proclamation of 1763, enacted by George III 
following the conclusion French and Indian War between Britain and France, had sought to 
establish standards for the settlement of Indian lands. This Proclamation ensured protection of 
lands not “ceded” to the American colonies or Britain from confiscation or disruption without 
contract or agreement for Indian use. All of those lands not purchased by the British were meant 
to be possessed by the native tribes. The Proclamation acknowledged the “Frauds and Abuses” 
performed against the Indians involving their lands, and in an effort to avoid future injustices, the 
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Proclamation dictated the terms of any future acquisitions of Indian land and prohibited private 
purchase of any land from Indian tribes.94 Theoretically, the Indian tribes were protected under 
British proclamation, but the tribes were not only dependent on the British government for 
staying true to their agreement regarding the protection of Indian property but also reliant on the 
white mans’ supplies and services for mere survival. Despite their desire to be autonomous, the 
Indian nations were unable to survive independently of their opposition.95 
 The British actively engaged in acquiring Indian support in the beginning of the war and 
had been fairly successful throughout the war in protecting this alliance. Historian Wayne E. Lee 
describes the collaboration the Iroquois tribes formed with the British as a result of strategic 
British attempts to obtain Indian support over American forces. The influential, highly skilled, 
and Western educated Indian Joseph Brant possessed influence over his people that proved 
highly beneficial to the British militarily. Brant’s authority and position enabled him to pledge 
his allegiance to the nation whose government would best benefit his own nation’s interests. In 
the debate over which power he should lend his support to, Lee explains that “[Brant’s] choice 
was easy. His efforts, combined with intense British diplomacy, pulled four of the Iroquois 
nations into war on the British side.”96  
Regardless of the easy choice, the Iroquois were caught between their need for trade and 
protection and their desire to remain neutral in the impending conflict between America and 
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Britain. Many of the tribes did not want to alienate the Americans or the British, since both 
groups had proved economically beneficial in the past. Colin Calloway in his work The 
American Revolution in Indian Country argues that the Indian nations were in the habit of pitting 
each side against one another in order to avoid choosing their allegiance and in an effort to keep 
dialogue open with white settlers. The struggle of loyalties created division even among the 
Iroquois tribes due to growing tensions between Britain and America as Britain continued to flex 
its military, political, and economic muscles in Indian country.97 “Nothing hurt the pro-American 
and neutral Delawares more,” Calloway explains, “than the United States’s failure to supply 
them with goods and trade in time of war.”98  
Despite strong efforts to stay out of the war, it became increasingly difficult as the war 
progressed for the Indian nations to remain impartial. War within their own land and increasing 
demands by both American and British officials required the Iroquois to pledge their support for 
one nation or the other. Supplies and weapons became a determining factor in the choice. Long 
before the Revolution British authorities had formed a strategic alliance with Indian tribes based 
on a mutual understanding that Britain would provide security for the Indian nations as well as 
much needed food and supplies and trade in return for their allegiance and cooperation. Though 
American and British interests had coincided in the past and the Indian tribes did not have to 
divide their loyalties, the Revolution brought an entirely new dynamic to the situation, one that 
jeopardized Indian assets.99 Although the Oneida and portion of the Tuscarora tribes chose to 
fight with American forces, Calloway argues that “most of the Indians who eventually sided with 
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Britain did so after American acts of treachery, inability to provide trade, and continued pressure 
on their lands convinced them they had no choice in the struggle for survival but to support the 
crown.”100  
 To those tribes who decided to remain loyal to the American side, there still persisted 
questions on the economic and financial merit of the decision. The Iroquois were in desperate 
need of supplies that the British more often than the Americans generously offered. Concerning 
this dilemma, an Indian council expressed their dilemma to French minister M. le Chevalier de la 
Luzerne in 1780, “If our father is allied to the Americans, why do these allow us to be in want of 
everything; must we die together with our wives and children while rejecting the offers which 
the English make to us; we do not like them; we are ready to strike, but our urgent needs will 
finally force us to lend an attentive ear to their proposition.”101 
 In his “Supplement,” Franklin not only articulated his frustrations with British policy but 
also interpreted the dilemma of the Indian tribes regarding the American-British conflict. The 
increasing opposition to British control created an increasing hostility toward those native tribes 
who supported the British. The Seneca chief of Franklin’s “Supplement” naively believed that 
the British would protect and compensate the Indian people for their sacrifice, “We expect the 
great King will give us another Country, that our Children may live after us, and be his Friends 
and Children, as we are.”  The growing dependency of the Indian tribes on British traders and 
merchants because of unfair trading practices and treaties further supported Franklin’s contempt 
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for British procedure, “We have only to say farther that your Traders exact more than ever for 
their Goods: and our Hunting is lessened by the War, so that we have fewer Skins to give for 
them. This ruins us,” Franklin’s Indian chief complained in the “Supplement, “We are poor: and 
you have Plenty of every Thing. We know you will send us Powder and Guns, and Knives and 
Hatchets: but we also want Shirts and Blankets.”102 
Carla Mulford explains that Franklin would have known his audience when writing the 
“Supplement” and expected both American and British readers to absorb and understand his 
claims made throughout the “Supplement.” London’s Public Advertiser published Franklin’s 
article in September of 1782 and several references to the article such as those made by Horace 
Walpole in his letter to the Countess of Ossory reveal that the article was circulated and read by 
large audiences in Britain.103 In a letter to John Adams, Franklin described his underlying 
motivations for publishing the article, “If it were re-publish’d in England it might make them 
alittle asham’d of themselves.”104 
Mulford describes Franklin’s incentive for publishing the “Supplement” as going beyond 
simply relaying Indian atrocities to the general public; Americans and Britons alike would have 
already been familiar with the threat of Indian aggression. Franklin’s primary purpose for the 
“Supplement” rested in his desire to influence peace negotiations between the British and 
America by pointing out the depravity of British policy. “If we read the ‘scalping’ letter in the 
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context of Franklin’s peace negotiations and his other writings on the problems with the British 
ministry,” Mulford explains, “the hoax is not really about the Iroquois so much as it is about the 
British atrocities against their own countrypeople.”105 
With this knowledge, Franklin’s motives for publication are clear. His sarcastic rhetoric 
and rebukes of the British Crown and Parliament were meant to provoke response. Franklin had 
strong opinions about British treatment of Indians and Americans as well as the colonials under 
British imperial rule. These were the British subjects without representation in Parliament or 
control over their own political and governmental affairs. Franklin’s graphic descriptions were 
not meant to highlight the decorum of the Indians, but to emphasize British extortion of Indian 
force and neglect in restraining them. Franklin held fairly open-minded views on Indian 
relations. Although his opinions still predomintately reflected eighteenth-century political theory, 
Franklin recognized the discrimination against many of the policies Britain implemented on 
native populations. To Franklin, alienating Indian groups were both economically and militarily 
unwise.106 In his explanation for the goals and intentions of the Albany Plan which he presented 
in 1754, Franklin recognized that Indian populations were often taken advantage of and therefore 
provoked to violence, “Many quarrels and wars have arisen between the colonies and Indian 
nations, through the bad conduct of traders; who cheat the Indians after making them drunk, &c. 
to the great expence of the colonies both in blood and treasure.” Franklin understood that often 
white men were the guilty party in instigating the conflicts between settlers and Indians, “The 
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Indians have been cheated by such private purchases, and discontent and wars have been the 
consequence.107 
Franklin also asserted his low opinion of British oppressive authority and his infuriation 
with British extortion of her subjects in subsequent writings following his publication of the 
“Supplement.”108 In 1784, in his essay “Remarks concerning the Savages of North America,” 
Franklin revealed his opinions on relations between the white man and Indian: “Savages we call 
them, because their manners differ from ours, which we think the Perfection of Civility; they 
think the same of theirs. Perhaps if we could examine the manners of different Nations with 
Impartiality, we should find no People so rude as to be without Rules of Politeness; nor any so 
polite as not to have some remains of Rudeness.”109 
 Franklin has long been recognized for his forward thinking and transcending ideas. What 
has not been so readily apparent to historians is the significance of the “Supplement” in context 
to the evolution of Franklin’s ideas. His satire emphasized the most extreme cases of British 
atrocities and misconduct, but the truth which underscored the primary points of Franklin’s 
article was the political, economic, and social domination Britain attempted to implement on her 
colonial subjects. In 1777, Franklin wrote to close friend, Dutch scientist Jan Ingenhousz, 
regarding the growing offenses of Britain and his increasing frustrations with British conduct in 
the war, “Indeed there is no Occasion for their Aid to sharpen my Resentment against a Nation, 
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that has burnt our defenceless Towns in the midst of Winter, has excited the Savages to 
assassinate our innocent Farmers with their Wives and Children.”110 His contention here 
reflected the assertions of the “Supplement”: Franklin placed the blame of Indian atrocity not so 
much on the native tribes themselves but on what he felt was a destructive and manipulative 
government unwilling to control their military forces. In the same year he wrote to Ingenhousz, 
Franklin expressed his opinions on Britain’s economic and resource mismanagement in a 
publication he issued contending for financial support from European nations for American 
interests in the war. In this exposition, Franklin listed Britain’s mismanagement of funds and 
absence of new resources for wealth accumulation as reasons for her lack of credibilit. Franklin 
believed British corruption extended to politics and economics and resulted in crimes against her 
own people. Franklin’s argument for the defense of American character sounded much like his 
complaints to Ingenhousz, “The English prosecuted the War against us with unexampled 
Barbarity, burning our defenceless Towns in the midst of Winter and arming Savages against 
us.”111 
These opinions marked Franklin’s conversations and publications until the close of the 
war. Franklin believed that the British were responsible for the behavior of their Indian 
mercenaries. With the conclusion of the first half of the “Supplement,” Franklin summarized the 
calloused posture of Britain’s foreign policy and Revolutionary conduct: “Thousands of People 
are flocking to see them [the scalps] this Morning, and all Mouths are full of Execrations.” 
                                                          
110 Benjamin Franklin “Benjamin Franklin to Jan Ingenhousz, February 12[-March 6, 1777], The 
Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 23, October 27, 1776, through April 30, 1777, ed. William B. Willcox 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 310-314.  
 
111 Benjamin Franklin, “Comparisons of Great Britain to America, as to Credit, in 1777, [Before 8 
September 1777],” The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 24, ed. William B. Willcox, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1984), 508-514. 
52 
 
Franklin’s description betrays his disgust with Parliament and the Crown, “It is now proposed to 
make them up in decent little Packets, seal and direct them; one to the King, containing a Sample 
of every Sort for his Museum; one to the Queen, with some of Women and little Children: the 
Rest to be distributed among both Houses of Parliament; a double Quantity to the Bishops.”112 
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Chapter 3 
The Jones Letter: A Censure of British Hypocrisy 
 The second half of Franklin’s “Supplement” further addressed the hypocrisy of British 
policy. As was his custom, Franklin turned to paper and pen to express his frustrations with the 
economics and politics of British imperialism while providing a satirical rebuke of British policy. 
The second fictitious letter of the “Supplement,” written under the name of John Paul Jones, was 
produced in response to Sir Joseph Yorke’s accusations of piracy based on an encounter in 1779 
between the Bonhomme Richard, an American ship commanded by Jones, and two British ships 
the Serapis, commanded by Captain Richard Pearson, and a smaller ship, the Countess of 
Scarborough. An American victory, the battle resulted in the surrender of the Serapis and 
Countess of Scarborough as well as the capture of the British crew and seizure of the badly 
damaged Serapis, which Jones sailed to the Netherlands for restoration purposes. This incident 
only enflamed British officials against American forces since Jones negated returning the ship 
and the Serapis’s commander to England as he had promised to do once he arrived in the 
Netherlands. Sir Joseph Yorke, British ambassador to the Netherlands, returned Jones’s blatant 
defiance with accusations of piracy. Yorke deemed Jones’s “claim [to] the Serapis & the 
Scarborough as being no legal prizes; being taken by rebels, & by a Subject of the English 
King.”113 Since the British had shown reluctance to exchange American naval prisoners for 
British captives and generally refused to cooperate with American military demands, Franklin 
believed that British charges of piracy were not only unfounded, but hypocritical. The 
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“Supplement” provided an outlet for Franklin to simultaneously express his frustrations and 
mock British hypocrisy. 
 The second letter of the “Supplement” described the key points of Franklin’s political 
opinions on America’s position within the British Empire and  the war. Yorke had accused 
Jones, and by extension, America, of piracy. Franklin maintained that these claims were not only 
fallacious but reflective of British activities rather than American exploits. Franklin believed 
Britain had been overstepping her political boundaries for quite some time, as he demonstrated in 
the essays and articles which preceded the publication of the “Supplement.” Through his 
assertions in the Albany Plan of Union of 1754, Franklin expressed his design for the political 
and economic future of America while his later publication “On Claims to the Soil of North 
America,” published in 1773, explained the degree to which he believed colonial authority 
extended. Through these writings, Franklin’s revealed the future he saw for America, a future 
based on sovereign rights of economic and political liberty. Franklin’s opinions and explanations 
found in his articles, essays, and letters correlated to his complaints and criticisms of the 
“Supplement.” Franklin argued that British expansion across the globe increased hostility that 
subjugated the growing empire into not only paying taxes that stymied colonial economic 
development but also submitting to political encroachment that stifled individual freedoms. 
Franklin was unamused at British attempts to dominate American interests at the expense of 
imperial progress, but he was especially disturbed by how the opinions of British officials 
affected war related issues. For Franklin, any hopes of peace between America and Britain as the 
war drew to a close meant total reconciliation between the two nations or no peace at all. This 
further meant that Britain would need to acknowledge her diplomatic misbehavior in respect the 
atrocities Franklin believed were committed in the name of the King. These atrocities involved 
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not only the extortion of Indian force against the colonists but also the treatment and containment 
of American prisoners of war. Franklin was especially affronted by the general lack of exchange 
of prisoners between Britain and America as well as the poor treatment many American soldiers 
suffered. Franklin spent much of the war contending these issues, finally accumulating his 
frustrations into the satirical exposition which was the “Supplement” to the Boston Independent 
Chronicle. 
 Franklin’s initial contention in the second letter of the “Supplement” was based on 
Yorke’s claims of piracy. In the “Supplement,” Franklin defined pirate “to be hostis humani 
generis, [an enemy to all mankind].”114 Though Yorke had accused Jones of piracy for 
confiscation of British property, Franklin claimed American exploits were for the cause liberty 
rather than plunder, unlike the abuses of the British Empire. Britain’s exploitations were the root 
cause of Franklin’s aggravation expressed in the “Supplement.” The first half of the 
“Supplement” defined Franklin’s opinion of Britain’s extortion of Indian force and their 
atrocities toward civilians. The second half of his “Supplement” probed further into Britain’s 
illegitimate claims as an empire and her management of colonial possessions and interests. 
Furthermore, the both letters of the “Supplement” articulated the points of the Declaration of 
Independence by attacking Parliament and the king for forsaking the moral principles and 
individual liberties which so many Britons held dear.  
In addressing the piratical claims Yorke made toward John Paul Jones, Franklin recalled 
the British politician John Hampden’s challenge of a ship tax issued by Charles I in the 
seventeenth century. Hampden had refused to pay the tax, claiming Charles’s actions were 
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unconstitutional since they were not initiated by Parliament. Hampden’s actions triggered the 
beginning of the English Civil War in 1642. Franklin challenged, “Have you then forgot the 
incontestible principle, which was the foundation of Hambden’s glorious lawsuit with Charles 
the first, that ‘what an English king has no right to demand, an English subject has a right to 
refuse?’’115 Franklin called attention to the political alliances Yorke and his father, Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke, avidly upheld. Hardwicke had been a prominent Whig and influential 
lawyer of the early eighteenth century, responsible for his son’s significant rise in British 
politics. Yorke supported the Whig party throughout his political career, but Franklin claimed 
that Yorke had forsaken the essentials of Whig ideology. Franklin’s insult was based on an 
American idea of Whig principles that differed from those of the British Whig party. These 
differences framed the argument of Franklin’s “Supplement” as well as the Revolutionary 
conflict in general. 
The Whig party that dominated British politics for over a hundred years had evolved 
from events that transpired during the seventeenth century following the English Civil War. In 
contrast to the Tory political party that sought for a more powerful, traditional monarchy, Whigs 
supported the power of a representative body and constitutional monarch over the absolute right 
and rule of kings; the Whig party had played an important role in the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 and was essential to the expulsion of Catholic King James II from the throne. Their politics 
were built on a tradition of individual liberty while advancing the concept of representative 
government that held kings accountable to their people and the ruling bodies that gave them 
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power.116 Yorke’s father as well as Yorke himself supported the Whig party, but Franklin 
believed Yorke’s loyalties were slipping. For Franklin, Yorke no longer represented the 
distinctive liberties that the Whig party claimed to uphold. Franklin asserted, “But you cannot so 
soon have forgotten the instructions of your late honourable father, who, being himself a sound 
Whig, taught you certainly the principles of the Revolution, and that, ‘if subjects might in some 
cases forfeit their property, kings also might forfeit their title, and all claim to the allegiance of 
their subjects.’”117 Franklin, however, had a different view of Whig ideology than did Yorke or 
his fellow English politicians. Historian Lee Ward explains that the fanatical philosophy of 
individual rights or “popular sovereignty” and the concept of a king who derived his authority 
from the people rather than God was advanced by the radical British Whigs of the seventeenth 
century. By the eighteenth century, however, this philosophy had tempered into a more 
conventional political ideology that called for centralized power within the representative body 
of Parliament rather than concentrated authority in the hands of the people. The British Whigs of 
the eighteenth century embraced this less extreme interpretation of power while American 
politicians in the colonies identified with a more fanatical interpretation of Whig politics.118 
Ward argues, “The long experience of self-government and benign neglect from the mother 
country encouraged Americans to see their colonial assemblies as a reflection of popular 
sovereignty rather than merely subordinate legislatures governed by the supreme authority in 
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Britain.”119 Franklin’s accusations berated Yorke for abandoning his political heritage and his 
familial loyalties based on a radical Whig philosophy. The American colonies had revolted 
against the claims of Parliament and the Crown that sought to subject them to demands that 
raged against the concepts of self-government and popular sovereignty.  
Many of the principles to which Yorke so vehemently held were also based on an aging 
diplomatic philosophy that joined Britain to Austria and the Dutch Republic against their mutual 
enemy, France. While eastern powers such as Russia grew in prominence and influence and the 
strength of the Dutch Republic and France waned, Yorke, along with other British politicians, 
remained fixated on maintaining a strong coalition between Austria and the Dutch. Following 
Jones’s refusal to obey Yorke’s orders to return the Serapis and its prisoners following the battle 
with the Bonhomme Richard and instead remain within the protective realms of neutral Dutch 
territory, Yorke attempted to persuade British authorities to apprehend Jones and his bounty 
despite Dutch stance to not get involved in the American war.120 Franklin highlighted Jones’s 
ignorance and backward political mindset with his ridicule of Yorke’s hypocrisy.121 
Franklin hurled accusations against Yorke and his colleagues. These accusations were 
composed as questions, carefully constructed to expose the duplicity of Yorke’s allegations 
against Jones. With his questions, Franklin summarized the claims of the Declaration of 
Independence, “If then a king declares his people to be out of his protection, violates their 
constitutional rights, wages war against them, plunders their merchants, ravages their coasts, 
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burns their towns, engages savages to murder their defenceless [populations], excites domestic 
insurrections -- Does not so atrocious a conduct towards his subjects, dissolve their 
allegiance?”122  Franklin answered his own rhetorical questions with a comparison of George III 
to the sadistic Roman emperor Nero, “By continuing in his present course a few years longer,” 
Franklin predicted, “[He] will have destroyed more of the British people than Nero could have 
found inhabitants in Rome.”123 Franklin’s disdain for King George was openly apparent in this 
discourse. Franklin despised the tyrannical fashion of both the king and Parliament throughout 
the Revolution. In this “Supplement,” Franklin made his audience fully aware of his disapproval 
with insults mocking the oppression with which Franklin believed British leaders enslaved their 
fellow citizens, “Voluntary malice, mischief, and murder are from Hell: and this king will, 
therefore, stand foremost in the list of diabolical, bloody, and execrable tyrants.” Franklin did not 
forget Parliament’s role in these grievances. For Franklin, Parliament’s lack of restraint on King 
George constituted an approval of his actions. The graphic imagery Franklin used to describe the   
apathy of Parliament reveals his disgust with the British government, “His base-bought 
parliaments too, who sell him their souls, and extort from the people the money with which they 
aid his destructive purposes, as they share his guilt, will share his infamy.” Franklin held the 
members of Parliament responsible for what he believed were devastating atrocities, all done in 
an effort to accomplish the demands of the Crown, “Parliaments, who to please him, have 
repeatedly, by different votes year after year, dipped their hands in human blood, insomuch that 
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methinks I see it dried and caked so thick upon them, that if they could wash it off in the Thames 
which flows under their windows, the whole river would run red to the Ocean.”124 
Franklin expressed his political opinions on British authority in the first few paragraphs 
of the Jones’ letter. These were ideals he had spent some time writing about in the decades 
preceding the Revolution and the publication of this “Supplement.” Carla Mulford in her work 
Benjamin Franklin and the Ends of Empire gives an excellent analysis of Franklin’s ideas 
concerning British imperialism as well as his opinions on public and private authority in her 
interpretation of Franklin’s political and economic vision for North America and the British 
Empire. Franklin’s ideas represented in the Albany Plan of Union, composed in 1754 as well as 
the ideas he expressed in his other writings such as his essay “On Claims to the Soil of America” 
written in 1773. These publications reveal the evolution of Franklin’s standards for America’s 
future within the empire.125 
The Albany Plan of Union originated from the Albany Congress, a commission of 
representatives from seven of the thirteen colonies called together by government officials of 
New York in order to stabilize relations between the a Iroquoian tribes and the colonists. Initially 
organized as a response to the French and Indian War as an effort to anticipate and combat any 
French attack coming from the Ohio Valley, the congress evolved into an attempt to connect the 
colonies under a consolidated government for political and economic unification.126 Franklin 
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became the primary draftsman of the Albany Plan, which was intended to merge the colonies 
with mutual governmental, economic, and defensive objectives in order to structure and simplify 
correspondence and relations while connecting the colonies under one political purpose. The 
plan also made allowance for taxation of the colonies by the new government and an appointed 
administrator and representative assembly.127 The Albany Plan was the instigator of Franklin’s 
“JOIN, or DIE” cartoon published in his Pennsylvania Gazette, representing the dysfunction of 
colonial division in the face of an impending French attack. Franklin’s purpose for the plan was 
an indication of his ideas regarding America’s position in the British Empire. Though at this 
point, Franklin was not promoting a separation from the British Empire as an independent nation, 
Franklin recognized the need for unity among the colonies for what historian Timothy Shannon 
has called a need to establish a “central role in Britain’s future prosperity.”128 Franklin held fast 
to the hope that as America continued in the vein of economic sufficiency and near political 
autonomy, she could align herself neatly alongside Britain as a collaborator and colleague rather 
than subordinate colony. This “equal partnership” would only come from a collective effort of 
the colonists to combine their political and economic interests to assume a vital place within the 
realm of British interests and future growth.129 The plan was wholly unsuccessful because many 
of the colonial representatives believed that it sequestered too much individual freedom that 
colonists were unwilling to part with at that time; however, an indication of Franklin’s ideas 
regarding America’s place in the British Empire, both politically and economically, were 
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exposed through his efforts to combine colonial resources in an attempt to assert America’s 
position as a valuable asset to British interests.130  
Nearly two decades later, on the eve of the Revolution, Franklin published his essay “On 
Claims to the Soil of America” which declared his frustration with British assertion of 
superiority over the American colonies and identified the idea that those people who held the 
land directly were the proprietors and therefore the administrators of the land. Although the 
British government’s regulations and decrees insinuated that American interests were inferior to 
those of the British because America was a colony of Britain rather than the central headquarters 
of it, Franklin contested that American interests were equal to those interests of English residents 
living within the British Isles. Franklin believed that Americans were the rightful proprietors 
over the colonies since they were the ones who procured the land.131 Franklin contended that 
taxation of American colonies was in violation of American rights as Englishmen because 
Americans did not have a voice in Parliament. Many British politicians and King George 
counter-argued that the levying of taxes against Americans was justified regardless of the lack of 
representation in Parliament because numerous British citizens within Britain’s borders were 
under the same condition. Franklin claimed the officials who defended this opinion were 
“arguing from bad to worse.”132 He frustratingly contended, “If any here are unjustly deprived of 
that Privilege, restore it. Do right at home, if you please, and then make that a Precedent for 
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doing right abroad: But never think that doing wrong at home will justify your doing wrong all 
the World over.133 
Franklin’s conceptions of political autonomy and national sovereignty were based on the 
idea that new nations are capable of creating and determining new, individualized directives for 
themselves based on their own cultural needs and philosophies. This perception differed from a 
more prevalent, traditional view of power existing during the eighteenth century which dictated 
that colonies and nations derived autonomy from those powers already established. With the 
burgeoning of new government and politics in the establishment of America as a nation, Franklin 
believed that American sovereignty was not dependent on British authority but contingent on 
American political standards and principles. Franklin’s ideas were groundbreaking for his time 
and helped to influence the establishment of the new American government, first by the Articles 
of Confederation and then by the Constitution but most importantly with America’s assertion of 
independence from Great Britain and the drafting of the Declaration of Independence.134  
Not only through his important published works, but also through his letters and personal 
writings, Franklin revealed his ideals on personal freedoms and the obligations of citizenry. 
These ideas developed into the opinions he manifested in the “Supplement.” Early in Franklin’s 
writings, such as in the expositions written in the 1750s and ‘60s as well as the 1770s, Franklin 
expressed his thoughts on preserving British authority and influence across the globe and 
growing the empire’s economic and political power. These ideas developed to include Franklin’s 
personal convictions on individual rights and responsibilities, specifically the right of colonies to 
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operate without economic and political constraints while maintaining a place under the 
protection and function of the empire. Franklin realized by the Revolution that neither Parliament 
nor the Crown considered its colonies equal participants in the affairs of the empire, and he 
believed that the only natural response to this dilemma was for America to assert her 
independence from Britain. These principles influenced Franklin’s ideas and publications on 
rights to land and territory, strengthening his arguments for independence. Franklin believed that 
those people who contracted and obtained the land initially, whether by agreements with native 
populations or original settlement, were entitled to the ownership of the land.135 For Britain to 
levy unreasonable taxes and assert ownership over American territory was in violation of a 
principle Franklin enumerated in the “Supplement,” “the law of God— ‘Thou shalt not steal,’”136   
Britain spent the greater part of the eighteenth century at war with one or more European 
power, namely France. Despite a span of peaceful years in the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, Britain had engaged in several decades of conflict prior to the Revolution. These 
struggles were in direct correlation to British expansionism which vied for dependent holdings or 
colonies across the globe for the acquisition of wealth and material resources and the 
proliferation of political ideology, economic philosophy, and faith around the world.137 Though 
Franklin was not opposed to the growth of the British Empire as a whole, he disagreed with 
British procedure that suppressed the rightful freedoms of colonial peoples for the purpose of 
advancing Britons on the main island without any thought to the welfare of colonials. He 
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believed that the greatest success for the empire would come from policies which allowed 
Americans to operate their governments and economies under the protection of the British 
Empire but uninhibited by regulations established by an unrepresentative government body such 
as Parliament.138 Franklin’s ideals evolved throughout the eighteenth century to the place of the 
“Supplement.” Not only a piece of propaganda meant to influence peace and ridicule British 
authority, Franklin’s “Supplement” represented his ideas on liberty and an American future as 
well as an accumulation of his past frustrations with the policies of the British government. 
Franklin addressed the issue of British aggression and hostility within the “Supplement,” 
naming Britain, “An enemy to, and at war with one whole quarter of the world, America, 
considerable parts of Asia and Africa, a great part of Europe, and in a fair way of being at war 
with the rest.”139 Franklin attacked not only the actions of the empire as a whole but the spirit of 
British citizens, Parliament, and the king. Franklin mocked the beloved English stories of 
romanticized gallantry that accompanied the accounts of British exploits, condemning the 
idealization of characters like Robin Hood or historical figures such as Alexander the Great who 
were most famous for their acts of robbery and pillaging. Franklin argued that “this spirit” which 
prompted “more highway robberies that there [were] in all the rest of Europe put together” lent 
itself to the destructive wars Britain continually instigated. The height of British aggression, 
Franklin argued, materialized into warmongering propensities that turned destructively inward 
toward British colonial holdings rather than outward toward Britain’s national enemies. Franklin 
criticized, “Hence, having lately no war with your ancient enemies, rather than be without a war, 
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you chose to make one upon your friends.” The actions of the British government were insidious 
to Franklin because he believed that this “highway robbery” conducted in the name of Parliament 
and the Crown not only went against national standards of decorum but also moral standards. “In 
this your piratical war with America,” Franklin complained, “the mariners of your fleets, and the 
owners of your privateers were animated against us by the act of your parliament, which repealed 
the law of God— ‘Thou shalt not steal,’—by declaring it lawful for them to rob us of all our 
property that they could meet with on the Ocean.”140 
As the American colonists asserted independence over British authority and progressed 
toward settling peace and framing the margins of self-government, Franklin was compelled to 
reaffirm his opinions on British conduct in the war and her responsibility as an empire. The 
“Supplement” not only provided Franklin a medium by which to satirically rebuke the actions of 
Parliament and the Crown in respect to what he believed were reprehensible atrocities of the war, 
but also offered a place for him to express his dissatisfaction with British imperial diplomacy.  
Franklin hoped not only for peace, but also reconciliation, or an admittance by Britain to the 
atrocities committed during the war and a semblance of effort to make reparations on this point. 
Although Franklin could not ensure that his opinions transcribed in the “Supplement” would 
influence British officials to the point of transforming the attitude or engagements of Parliament 
and the Crown to reform on a global scale, Franklin recognized his influence on local affairs and 
sought to affect negotiations accordingly. To David Hartley in 1782 Franklin wrote, “I am 
pleased to see in the Votes & parliamentary Speeches, and in your public Papers that in 
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mentioning America, the Word Reconciliation is often used. It certainly means more than a mere 
Peace.”141  
Franklin’s frustration over British imperialism and the mismanagement of her colonial 
holdings spilled into another major argument. Because of the rebellious state of the American 
colonies, British officials were not always eager or willing to handle military situations with the 
level of decorum expected by international standards. From Franklin’s point of view, this most 
heavily affected American prisoners of war, who were in an unusual position due to their 
political status. Although they were not slaves, American soldiers were by definition traitors, 
which often brought on unfair treatment and punishment as a result of their insurgence.  Franklin 
was frustrated by the poor treatment of American prisoners throughout the war as well as the 
general lack of exchange of prisoners between the two nations. The reluctance to exchange 
prisoners with America and their refusal to uphold international standards for prisoner treatment 
infuriated both Franklin and other American officials. Though at the beginning of the war 
Franklin’s hopes remained high for conducting prisoner exchange, by 1779 Franklin realized his 
efforts to secure exchanges were mostly in vain. Franklin wrote to David Hartley concerning the 
lack of cooperation on Britain’s part, “I a long time believed that your Government were in 
earnest in agreeing to an Exchange of Prisoners. I begin now to think I was mistaken. It seems 
they cannot give up the pleasing Idea of having at the End of the War 1000 Americans to hang 
for high Treason.”142  
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Franklin believed that British leaders prevented successful prisoner exchanges in reaction 
to American independence, however, Britain was not alone in her unwillingness to conduct 
exchanges. Holger Hoock argues in his work Scars of Independence that America was reluctant 
to exchange prisoners as well, preferring to use prisoners as bargaining agents in persuading 
Britain to accept American independence. Congress did not want to readily offer the British back 
their highly skilled soldiers if America was not to receive something substantial in return. 
Americans such as Franklin and even Washington were more inclined to facilitate mutual 
tradeoffs, but more often than not, Congress in conjunction with British officials prevented these 
exchanges.143 In his correspondence published after the war, General Cornwallis expressed 
frustration with Americans over their hesitancy to cooperate with British authorities over 
exchange of British prisoners. Despite British willingness to work out the terms of exchange on 
several occasions, Americans were content to hold on to British prisoners if their diplomatic 
qualifications were not met, especially following Saratoga. Editor Charles Ross discloses in his 
commentary of Cornwallis’s correspondence that “the whole of the British prisoners were 
detained in captivity more or less close, till the termination of the war, the Americans preferring 
in this, as in several other similar cases, rather than to violate their pledges than to allow the 
English the advantage of a reinforcement of trained troops.”144  
According to historian Philip Ranlet, one of the primary reasons most British 
commanders were hesitant to authorize an exchange was due to the difficulties in maintaining the 
prisoners for exchange. Cornwallis believed it much more convenient and beneficial to his own 
                                                          
143 Hoock, Scars of Independence, 183. 
 
144 Charles Cornwallis, Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis, vol. 1, Charles 
Ross, ed. (London: John Murray 1859), 36.  
 
69 
 
soldiers if the prisoners were transported to prison ships instead of wasting British support as 
security for prison camps and transport within the colonies. His men were then available to fight 
rather than sentry the American prisoners.145 In most instances, prisoner exchange was impeded 
by some effort from both sides. Neither the British nor Americans were wholly committed to 
cooperation in prisoner exchange.  This was largely due to the fact that the American Congress 
and British officials usually acted according to their own nations’ best interests and usually 
insisted on terms which best suited this agenda. 
By 1782, Franklin fully condemned the British for their lack of collaboration on the 
prisoner situation despite some American efforts to thwart exchanges. Franklin’s complaints also 
extended to British tolerance of horrible prison conditions. He used the “Supplement” to 
publicize his irritation, “During these six years past, [King George] has destroyed not less than 
forty thousand of those subjects, by battles on land or sea, or b starving them, or poisoning them 
to death, in the unwholesome air, with the unwholesome food of his prisons.”146  
The treatment of American prisoners of war under British authority has been a topic of 
research and discussion since the end of the Revolution. Despite the tradition of downplaying the 
severity of treatment for American prisoners that tainted accounts and historical examination in 
the nineteenth century, recent studies of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have determined 
that American soldiers were often malnourished and abused under British authority, with only 
few exceptions and especially in comparison to American treatment of British soldiers. Several 
factors including the extensive cost of the war and the lack of supplies and food available to the 
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British weighed heavily on British officials and not only affected prisoner treatment but also 
conditions for British soldiers.147 Part of the reason for British mistreatment of prisoners resulted 
from an act instated by Parliament in 1777 which dictated that those captured or “seized. . .in the 
act of high treason, committed in any of his Majesty’s colonies or plantations in America” would 
be subject to accusations and convictions of  “high treason.”148 Because American soldiers were 
considered rebels and traitors instead of enemy soldiers, the British government had very little 
desire or incentive to maintain any international standard of decorum for prisoner treatment. 
There was also the issue of how costly the war was for Britain; supplies and shelters for 
prisoners were only added expense to an already expensive war. Naval prisoners especially 
suffered extremely harsh conditions on British prison ships. George Washington pointed out to 
General Cornwallis in 1781 that “the inadequacy of the room in the prison-ships to the number of 
prisoners confined on board of them, which causes the death of many, and is the occasion of 
most intolerable inconveniences and distresses to those who survive”149  
Franklin’s grievances in the “Supplement” expressed his frustrations with Britain’s 
treatment of American prisoners, an issue which had irritated Franklin since the beginning of the 
war. By the eighteenth century, European standards for treatment of prisoners was fairly 
civilized and generous, even by today’s standards. Prisoners of war were to be supplied with 
adequate food and shelter. Unnecessary killing of prisoners was forbidden, and prisoners were 
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not to be conscripted for the enemy army. These were all standards that General Washington 
sought to uphold in the Continental Army. Although officers on either side of the battle were 
given preferential treatment, British treatment of enlisted American soldiers was not in 
concordance with traditional British standards.150 
One American officer who witnessed prison life for American prisoners firsthand was 
Captain John Thornton, commissioned to board British prison ships with a few supplies in an 
effort to assess the conditions of American soldiers. Though his findings were not grotesque, he 
reported on the general lack of clothing and food prisoners received. Thornton was especially 
bothered by the treatment of officers who were given no special privileges aside from their lower 
ranking subordinates. He was allowed to visit Forton Prison located in Gosport, a district of 
England near Portsmouth Harbor as well.  There he described the harsh penalties that the 
prisoners suffered as a result of an escape attempt, “They are punished with an unexampled 
severity for such an offence and tho’ many things that have appeared in the papers concerning 
the cruelty of [their?] Keepers have been exaggerated.” However, Thornton persisted, “There 
[are] many capricions and vexations arising from this quarter, which add greatly to the weight of 
their misery.”151  
More accounts from those who suffered on prison ships confirm Franklin’s complaints. 
Charles Herbert, who was captured aboard the Dolton in 1776 when he was just eighteen years 
of age, recorded the details of the poor conditions that he endured aboard a British prison ship. 
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Though his surroundings started out pleasant enough aboard the ship with adequate food and 
shelter, Herbert became desperately ill without necessary accommodations after several months 
of imprisonment. Herbert wrote on February 6, 1777, “We begin to grow very sickly, and twenty 
or thirty of us are suffering with the itch, and we are all dreadfully infested with vermin. I make a 
constant practice of examining my clothes every day . . . I often find them swarming with 
these.”152 For the sick, conditions were horrendous since many prison ships lacked the supplies 
or space to care for the diseased. Given the general standards of eighteenth-century medical 
practices, these men suffered greatly. “We are obliged to lay upon a wet deck,” Hebert wrote, 
“without even bedding or clothes, more than what we have on our backs – except a very few who 
have a very old blanket apiece.”153 
Herbert was eventually transported to a hospital in England after contracting smallpox 
and then taken to the Old Mill Prison in Plymouth. There, Herbert experienced the depraved 
conditions of inadequate food and supplies as well as deplorable living conditions. Spirits were 
low and many men resorted to eating grass and insects in order to stay off the pangs of hunger. 
Herbert recalled, “A great part of those in prison, eat at one meal what they draw for twenty long 
hours, and then go without until the next day. . .Often the cooks, after they have picked over our 
cabbage, will cut of the but-ends of the stalks, and throw them over the gate into the yard. . . 
These same cabbage stumps, hogs in America would scarcely eat if they had them.”154 
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American prisoners of war in the southern campaigns suffered especially harsh 
conditions. The Siege of Charleston, North Carolina in 1780, a victory for the British, brought in 
the largest amount of American prisoners of the entire conflict.155 The prisoner population in 
Charleston proved difficult for the British to manage due to the constant threat of escape as well 
as the increasing influx of prisoners from subsequent victories. The great expense that the sheer 
number of prisoners placed on British finances made operations difficult. These demands 
provoked the British to move the American prisoners to decommissioned British ships docked in 
Charleston Harbor. These ships were usually secure enough to contain prisoners but became 
overpopulated breeding grounds for disease and filth. Historian Carl Borick estimates that six of 
the specific ships the British used for harboring prisoners in Charleston could only hold about 
1,200 men although estimates for the prisoner population reached over 6,000 initially and grew 
over the passing months.156 The conditions aboard the ships were often deplorable. Donald 
Sellers, Charleston prisoner held captive on one of the prison ships in Charleston Harbor, 
described his experience as “such a severe prison was more than what I was able to stand Being 
at the same time without Money and Clothes eating [eaten] up with lice and rotton [rotten] with 
dirt I laid down at night the same as I walked about all day neither Blankets nor anything But the 
hard boards to rest upon.”157  
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Sickness abounded in the overcrowded, dirty quarters in which prisoners were forced to 
live while diseases such as yellow fever and small pox devastated prisoner populations. The lack 
of money and food for the British to supply their own forces further lowered any chances of 
American prisoners receiving extra rations or supplies from their enemy captors. Other 
organizational issues and budget constraints prevented sufficient provisions reaching the 
soldiers.158 Robert Chambers, American soldier held captive aboard one of the ships of 
Charleston remarked, “We were entirely destitute of money and almost every other necessary we 
had suffered a long and severe captivity during which we had receiv’d neither clothing nor pay . . 
. officers sympathized with us in our distress and would fain have relieved us but they were too 
much in our own situation to afford us any relief the most of us.”159 Chambers described his 
“distressed” condition aboard the ships as being “too great to be express’d.”160 
Franklin’s second letter of the “Supplement” was more direct than his first in that it did 
not graphically satirize atrocities conducted by the British military or their allies with fabricated 
accounts of murder and plunder; however, the purpose of the Jones’ letter paralleled the 
objective of the Indian letter quite closely. Over the decades preceding the American war for 
independence, Franklin had grown increasingly frustrated with British policy toward her colonial 
holdings. Britain’s handle of issues involving the conduct of her allied forces during the 
Revolution and the management of American prisoners of war worked to only further agitate him 
toward Parliament and the Crown. Franklin was known to express his frustrations through a 
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written medium; the “Supplement” was Franklin’s sardonic rebuke of the misconduct which he 
believed British officials were guilty. Safely disguised under the pennames of American heroes 
yet publically printed as an addition to a prominent colonial newspaper, Franklin berated British 
authority in an effort to expose what he perceived as the duplicity of their policies.  
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Chapter 4 
Peace Negotiations: Beyond Publication 
Franklin published his “Supplement” in the midst of serious peace negotiations between 
America and Britain as well as France, Spain, and the Dutch Republic. Efforts for peace and 
reconciliation commenced in earnest by the spring of 1782 following the American victory at the 
Battle of Yorktown in the autumn of 1781. Preliminary negotiations included British peace 
commissioner Richard Oswald as well as American negotiators John Jay, John Adams, Benjamin 
Franklin, and eventually Henry Laurens. Franklin assumed an important role in negotiations due 
to his prominent connections to British and French officials as well as his interest in securing 
reparations for American losses in the war. Britain’s initial reluctance to pay reparations for 
American losses and Parliament’s hesitancy to consider American sovereignty provoked 
Franklin to seek compromise that primarily benefitted the newly formed United States both 
politically and economically while compelling British officials to take responsibility for the 
violence promoted by British policy throughout the war. The “Supplement” revealed the basis 
for Franklin’s interest in negotiations and provided a foundation for the provisional peace treaty 
between America and Britain he created. This provisional peace was the essential workings of 
the peace treaty signed in 1783 that officially ended the war.  
Through his letters, Franklin revealed that his primary intention for publishing the 
“Supplement” was to inform his English brothers and sisters of the plight of the American 
position. He believed the majority of the British public were unaware of how governmental 
policy affected their fellow British citizens in the colonies. There is evidence that British 
newspapers circulated the “Supplement” and proof that British citizens read the article although 
there is little information available on British reactions to Franklin’s appalling descriptions. 
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Considering his intention to influence negotiations with the “Supplement,” Franklin partially 
failed in this objective; there is no direct link between British approval of peace and Franklin’s 
persuasive power over British opinion through “Supplement”; however, Franklin’s chief purpose 
in negotiations was to persuade the British to agree to reparations and grant America complete 
independence. In this objective, Franklin succeeded. Though Franklin’s article did not 
definitively influence negotiations on Britain’s behalf, the “Supplement” did provide a medium 
for Franklin to express his resentment of British policy and conduct toward the American 
colonies while allowing him to publish these complaints in a brilliant satirical exposition. The 
accumulation of ideas found in the “Supplement” formed a foundation for the provisional peace 
treaty Franklin created. The “Supplement” further represented Franklin’s dissatisfaction toward 
the British, dissatisfaction that motivated him to seek reparations for American interests in the 
final negotiations that ended the war and secured American liberty.                                                                                                        
The nature of the war and its progression as well as the remarkable outcome of the Battle 
of Yorktown were deciding factors in the final settlements of the Treaty of Paris in 1783 which 
effectively ended hostilities between Britain and America. The American victory at Yorktown 
and the surrender of General Cornwallis were naturally upsetting for the British but equally as 
surprising for Americans. America had suffered economic disruption and military difficulties 
throughout the war, saved only by the aid of the French who had significant military and political 
interest in an American victory. Even while the campaign on Yorktown progressed, there were 
influential American leaders who doubted the Continental Army’s capabilities. The 
extraordinary outcome of Yorktown solidified the terms of the Treaty of Paris. America’s 
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overwhelming victory in the battle assured American bargaining power against British interests 
in negotiations.161  
Britain’s reduced position proved essential to Franklin’s entreaties regarding peace.  
Franklin had been involved with the diplomatic affairs of American politics before the war and 
throughout its duration. His negotiating skills and ties to Europe in addition to his residence in 
France offered a natural place for him in peace negotiations. For Franklin, French assistance in 
the war had earned the French a position as partners in peace. The Treaty of Alliance signed in 
1778 which diplomatically tied France and America together also prevented separate peace from 
American negotiations with Britain.162 The leadership of Lord North in Parliament and the 
negligence of King George, however, frustrated any move toward lasting peace in the beginning 
stages of reconciliation. Historian Jonathan Dull argues that Franklin despised Lord North’s 
leadership so incessantly because North wished to negotiate with France and America separately 
while continuing to regard colonials as insurgent. North’s opinions closely reflected those of 
King George and Parliament which only further alienated Franklin toward British leadership. 
Franklin was willing to submit all negotiations to France in the beginning, in spite of British 
reluctance to negotiate with France and America collectively.163 However, by 1782, Lord North 
                                                          
161 John E. Ferling, Almost a Miracle: American Victory in the War for Independence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009): 568. 
 
162 “Treaty of Alliance,” February 6, 1778, American Revolution & New Nation: Primary 
Documents in American History, Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib 
/ourdocs/alliance.html, accessed October 11, 2018. The Treaty of Alliance was signed on February 6, 
1778, creating a military coalition between France and America. The treaty stipulated that any peace 
made with Great Britain to end the Revolution would require a recognition of total American 
independence. Any attempt by Great Britain to separate America and France in the peace process would 
be rejected. Because of these stipulations, American and French officials refused early British attempts to 
establish peace due to their continuous attempts to settle peace separately. 
 
163 Dull, “Franklin the Diplomat,” 53. 
 
79 
 
no longer occupied his position as Prime Minister and Lord Shelburne, who proved much more 
cooperative toward American interests, assumed office. Franklin considered Shelburne an 
associate and colleague and found this connection advantageous toward favorable peace.164 In 
1778, Franklin spoke of American prospects of peace pessimistically: “I therefore never think of 
your present Ministers and their Abettors, but with the Image strongly painted in my View of 
their Hands red, wet, and dropping with the Blood of my Countrymen, Friends and Relations. No 
Peace can be sign’d by those Hands.”165 Conversely, in 1782, Franklin, waiting negotiations 
involving Shelburne, announced rather enthusiastically, “I embrace the Opportunity of assuring 
the Continuance of my ancient Respect for your Talents and Virtues, and of congratulating you 
on the returning good Disposition of your Country in favour of America. I am persuaded it will 
have good Effects.” Franklin expected negotiations to make a drastic turnaround in favor of 
American interests and end in substantial reconciliation, “I hope it will tend to produce a general 
Peace, which I am persuaded your Lordship, with all good Men, desires, which I wish to see 
before I die, & to which I shall with infinite Pleasure contribute every thing in my Power.”166 
Despite this favorable turn in negotiations, Shelburne continued to strive for peace 
independent of France. Shelburne recognized the motivation for French desire to remain a part of 
negotiations. British defeat had vast political ramifications for French interests, and the addition 
of a permanent French-American connection would only further deplete British global influence. 
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Shelburne insisted on retaining some association with the American colonies regardless of the 
inevitable surrender of independence in order to preserve British dignity and interest. Shelburne 
insisted that if Britain must give up her valuable colonies, she would do so at least on favorable 
terms, uninhibited by French involvement.167 Shelburne wrote to Richard Oswald in July 1782 
concerning American independence, “You very well know that I have long since given it 
up decidedly tho’ reluctantly: and the same motives which made me perhaps the last to give up 
all Hope of the union, makes me most anxious if it is given up.” If Britain could somehow 
preserve a relationship with America as a political and economic ally, Britain could fortify her 
global position and interests. In order to maintain a cordial relationship with the former colonies, 
Shelburne had to recognize American stipulations, specifically Franklin’s stipulations, and at 
least partially meet American demands. Shelburne verbalized his intentions to Oswald in the 
midst of negotiations, “It shall be done decidedly, so as to avoid all further Risque of Enmity, & 
lay the Foundation of a new Connection better adapted to the present Temper & Interests of both 
Countries.”168 
Though initially reluctant, Shelburne came to realize that complete American 
independence from Great Britain was inevitable. Throughout the war, the idea of American 
sovereignty threatened the global authority of British interests and economic power and 
remained unpopular with many members of Parliament and the Crown. By 1778, a great number 
of British officials were more eager to offer America some sort of compromise that pacified her 
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desires for self-government but only within the supervision of British authority. By this time, 
however, American officials were fixed on nothing less than absolute freedom and determined to 
demand complete independence from British rule rather than settle for restricted liberty. While 
British position on American independence depended on the ever-changing opinions of the 
British ministers and varied controlling parties of Parliament, George III was resolved to 
maintain at least partial control of the colonies. A seesaw of concessions between Britain and 
America continued until early 1782 when the outcome of Yorktown and the length and expense 
of the war began to prompt British officials toward a peace more favorable to American interests. 
Shelburne, as well as the majority of Parliament recognized that the only hope for British 
interests in peace negotiations was to maintain some type of bargaining power over American 
demands.169 
For Shelburne, this meant that American peace was still contingent on separate 
negotiations between America and France; nevertheless, Franklin remained fixed on settling for 
peace only in conjunction with France in order to protect American assets. Shelburne, however, 
understood that one of his most important bargaining tools in negotiations were the demands of 
for American reparations. In these requests for restitution, Shelburne hoped to detach America 
from France and finalize a treaty that offered the best possible scenario for British interests. The 
general consensus of Parliament and Shelburne was that American independence was inevitable, 
but not without some stipulations. Most British officials recognized that the desire for peace on 
America’s part overruled any insistence or stubbornness on Franklin’s or the other 
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commissioners’ part to insist on unconditional peace or full French involvement.170 Shelburne 
strongly urged Richard Oswald, “Insist in the strongest manner, that if America is independent 
she must be so of the whole world. No Secret, Tacit or Ostensible Connection with France.”171 
Franklin was bothered by Britain’s efforts to pursue peace with the United States and 
France separately rather than jointly; he believed that these terms would neither benefit the 
United States nor successfully end the conflict. “They still seem to flatter themselves with the 
Idea of dividing us,” Franklin voiced in early 1782 to Robert Livingston, American secretary of 
foreign affairs. “Our Affairs,” Frankling continued, “go on generally well in Europe. Holland has 
been slow, Spain slower, but Time will I hope smooth away all Difficulties. Let us keep up not 
only our Courage but our Vigilance, and not be laid asleep by the pretended Half Peace the 
English make with us without asking our Consent. We cannot be safe while they keep Armies in 
our Country.”172  
Franklin had his own suggestions for peace that offered Britain some reimbursement for 
damages in an effort to secure American demands. The “Supplement” revealed that Franklin’s 
primary focus was on reparations for American losses endured by Indian attacks and British 
malfeasance as well as the return of American prisoners of war. Franklin understood that in order 
to secure this compensation, the British would need to obtain their reimbursement in return. As 
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peace negotiations progressed, Oswald met with Franklin in France and then returned to England 
with suggestions from Franklin for peace. Part of Franklin’s recommendations included British 
relinquishment of Canada to America as well as an exchange of prisoners to resolve American 
losses. Franklin made a point to insist on a “general not partial a peace” for the betterment of the 
two nations.173 Despite America’s increased position at bargaining peace since the victory at 
Yorktown, the proposal of Canadian cessation to the United States was impractical. Britain was 
neither willing nor able to offer such enormous reparation for American damages, and Franklin 
recognized this following his suggestion.174  
During discussions with Oswald, Franklin also made suggestions regarding the damages 
against Loyalists during the war, a major point of contention for the British. The British insisted 
on compensation for Loyalist losses if they were to grant America complete independence. 
Franklin’s desire to see reparations paid on American civilian losses of land and property 
prompted him to suggest that Britain cede Canada and abdicate any pursuance of compensation 
for Loyalists. With this agreement, Britain would sufficiently satisfy American reparations on 
civilian losses. Franklin expressed in his journal of negotiations, “I therefore wish’d England 
would think of offering something to relieve those who had suffer’d by its scalping and Burning 
Parties; Lives indeed could not be restor’d nor compensated, but the Villages and Houses 
wantonly destroy’d might be rebuilt.”175 These reparations coincided conveniently with one of 
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Franklin’s major frustrated expressions in the “Supplement.”176 However, these were suggestions 
that Franklin was under no authority to make and were not authorized by the American 
commission and could have potentially derailed negotiations entirely due to the absurdity of the 
request had Shelburne not been discreet about Franklin’s propositions.177 When conveying to 
John Adams the content of his conversation with Oswald, Franklin avoided telling Adams of his 
imprudent offer to compensate Loyalists on their losses in the war as well. Franklin admitted, “I 
was not pleas’d with my having hinted a Reparation to the Tories for their forfeited Estates; and I 
was a little asham’d of my Weakness in permitting the Paper to go out of my hands.”178 
Franklin’s reactions to British terms of peace and his efforts to solidify from Britain an 
assurance of reparations stemmed from his belief that Britain continued to treat America as a 
colony, not a nation. This position on American authority infuriated Franklin; he believed it was 
imperative a stable American future that Britain understand America’s rightful place in the world 
as a sovereign nation. Franklin’s expression of frustration within his personal letters and journal 
of peace negotiations were concurrent with his publication of the “Supplement.” In April, 1782, 
the same month he produced his article, Franklin described to George Washington the trouble at 
making peace with the British and their reluctance to end the war on American terms: 
The English seem not to know either how to continue the War, or to make Peace with us. 
Instead of entering into a regular Treaty, for putting an End to a Contest they are tired of, 
they have voted in Parliament that the Recovery of America by Force is impracticable, 
that an offensive War against us ought not to be continued, and that whoever advises it 
shall be deemed an Enemy to his Country.179  
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Franklin’s primary objective in procuring peace was to compel the British to admit their 
offenses, agree to reparations, and acknowledge America’s place as a sovereign nation so that 
America and Britain could continue with a cordial diplomatic relationship in the future. To 
David Hartley, British statesman and politician, Franklin wrote in April, 1782, “I am pleased to 
see in the Votes & parliamentary Speeches, and in your public Papers that in mentioning 
America, the Word Reconciliation [emphasis his] is often used. It certainly means more than a 
mere Peace.” His words reflected his anticipation at the prospect of reconciliation and, most 
importantly, reparations, “It is a sweet Expression. Resolve in your Mind, my dear Friend, the 
means of bringing about this Reconciliation . . . tho’ a Cessation of the War may be a Peace, it 
may not be a Reconciliation . . .”180 The promise of peace was enough to stir Franklin to offer 
British officials some advantage of peace in hope of speeding up the process, but Franklin also 
remained diligent in his desire to maintain American status as the victor nation and obtain his 
most important demands.  
Franklin’s ideas on sovereignty and the future of America’s place in a world post-
revolution influenced his ideas on peace with Great Britain. Franklin desired the British to 
acknowledge American independence without prerequisite or stipulation. British officials were 
not so keen to grant independence without some effort to reinforce British imperial authority and 
secure land and resources for the empire. This expression of what Franklin believed was an 
assertion of superiority on the part of the British influenced how he conducted himself 
throughout the war and explains his position in peace negotiations. One particular point that 
frustrated Franklin was the British assumption that granting American independence would act 
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as sufficient bargaining power in negotiations, providing Britain the opportunity to seek land and 
resources lost not only in the Revolution but also in previous wars. Franklin, like many 
Americans, believed that independence was not the only thing at stake in negotiations. American 
independence had already been declared and achieved. American losses were the thing to be 
restored. In conversation with Thomas Grenville, diplomat commissioned by Charles James Fox 
British Foreign Secretary to discuss peace negotiations, Franklin expressed this sentiment, “We 
do not consider ourselves as under any Necessity of bargaining for a Thing that is our own, and 
which we have bought at the Expence of so much Blood and Treasure, and which we are in full 
Possession of.”  Franklin berated the audacity of British assumption that the point of negotiations 
was to merely extend an acknowledgment of independence and in return receive compensation 
for a war in which they were defeated. British officials had anticipated France returning her 
acquired assets gained in the war since the “Original Object of the War [had been] obtained.”181 
To this Franklin replied, “As to our being satisfied with the original Object of the War . . . look 
back to the Conduct of your Nation in former Wars. [It is unreasonable] that a Nation after 
making an unprovok’d unsuccessfull War upon its Neighbours, should expect to sit down whole 
and have every thing restor’d which she had lost in such a War.”182    
 British-American negotiations continued to delay through the summer of 1782 due in 
large part to Britain’s refusal to officially acknowledge American independence in the 
stipulations of the peace treaty. By fall of the same year, British officials, primarily Shelburne, 
decided to grant American demands of complete sovereignty as well as fishing rights in 
Newfoundland and land bordering the Mississippi River with rights to navigate the river. 
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Shelburne was eager to solidify the terms of peace before Parliament resumed session, knowing 
that his flexibility in negotiations would drastically diminish once Parliament returned.183  The 
terms of peace extended to the withdrawal of British military forces from American soil without 
conflict. America offered compensation for Loyalist debts and the return of confiscated property. 
These preliminary negotiations did not involve France, but only on the stipulation that France 
would have part in the final negotiations and treaty.184  
Like Franklin and his fellow American commissioners, French commissioner Charles 
Gravier, Count of Vergennes was opposed to negotiating a peace specifically separate from 
America. In the beginning stages of negotiations, Vergennes did not wish to rush into any treaty, 
fearing that an expedited peace or individual treaty would not serve France’s best political or 
military interest. France’s military situation did facilitate a speedy peace, however. Despite the 
respite of major fighting between American and British forces following the Battle of Yorktown, 
French and Spanish forces continued battling over the Strait of Gibraltar during the negotiation 
process.185 The Great Siege of Gibraltar, which began in 1779 with the French and Spanish 
contention for control over British claims to the strait, continued until February of 1783 
following the signing of preliminary negotiations between Britain, Spain, and France. French and 
Spanish forces had organized a major attack against British defenses in September of 1782 but 
were utterly defeated by a much smaller British garrison. Following this demoralizing defeat of 
French forces, Vergennes became more enthusiastic about settling peace quickly and avoided 
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disputing the preliminary peace treaty signed by Britain and American in November 1782. 
Fortunately for Franklin, Vergennes lack of involvement in American negotiations until formal 
declarations were made allowed Franklin the liberty to discuss his most important points.186  
In November of 1782, Franklin summarized his stipulations for peace in his proposed 
articles for the peace treaty. Evidenced by the terms of the articles, Franklin sought for 
reparations for American losses. The articles included provisions for reimbursement of goods 
and property pillaged and devastated by the British Army including food, crops, and slaves. The 
nod to Franklin’s “Supplement” was reflected in these preliminary terms, “It is further agreed 
that his Britannic Majesty will also earnestly recommend it to his Parliament, to make 
Compensation for all the Towns, Villages and Farmes burnt and destroyed by his Troops or 
Adherents in the said United States.”187 Also included within the stipulations were provisions for 
an important issue Franklin had been fighting for half a decade. The conditions specified that “all 
Prisoners on both sides shall be set at Liberty.”188 Franklin included terms for land boundaries 
along the Great Lakes and Mississippi River as well as American fishing rights along 
Newfoundland and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Provisions for the United States to return land to 
British citizens and to allow them to continue peacefully with the full return of all prisoners of 
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war were also made. The conditional articles ended with a stipulation for “firm and perpetual 
Peace between his Britannic Majesty and the said States,”189   
The conditional peace was signed by Franklin and Oswald on November 30th and became 
the basis for the Treaty of Paris signed in 1783 affectively ending the conflict.190 Franklin’s 
provisions for peace were reflected in his “Supplement.” There were recommendations for 
compensation of American civilian losses as well as dictation for the return of prisoners of war. 
Though there is no clear evidence that Franklin’s “Supplement” affected the British 
commissioners’ acceptance of Franklin’s reparation suggestions, Franklin’s opinions affected the 
peace process substantially while his efforts solidified compensation for losses and complete 
independence. Arguably, Franklin was the primary reason America secured the reparations 
detailed in the Treaty of Paris and achieved enduring reconciliation with Great Britain. The 
“Supplement” laid a foundation for Franklin’s most important points for peace. 
Franklin meant for his “Supplement” to be read by the public, most importantly by 
British readers in order to bring to light the conduct of the British in America and as a result, 
possibly influence negotiations. Franklin was under the impression that British citizens were 
naïve to American troubles at the hands of their own countrymen. Franklin wrote of British 
diplomats, “They fill their Papers continually with Lies to raise and fall the Stocks. It is not amiss 
that they should thus be left to ruin one another, for they have been very mischievous to the Rest 
of Mankind.”191 Carla Mulford points out that Franklin printed the “Supplement” after he 
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conversed with Richard Oswald on establishing peace between America and Britain based on 
certain preconditions. Oswald would have ended their conversations and travelled to England in 
order to inform the public of ongoing negotiations. For Franklin, the “Supplement” offered an 
opportunity to address the British public with his own words and ideas rather than rely on 
Oswald to convey the content of their discussions.192 Franklin believed of the “Supplement,” "If 
it were re-publish’d in England it might make them a little asham’d of themselves.”193 He 
articulated the opinion that many British were unaware of the atrocities which took place in 
America. In the typical satirical fashion of the “Supplement,” Franklin proclaimed that American 
scalps were delivered to England and paraded through streets and villages where “thousands of 
People [were] flocking to see them. . . and all Mouths [were] full of Execrations,” perhaps in an 
effort to shock the British public into questioning the actions of their government overseas.194 
Shortly after he wrote the “Supplement,” Franklin sent a copy to America’s 
representative in Spain, John Jay. In his letter, Franklin did not reveal that he was the author of 
the article but did explain his growing anxiety over negotiations with England, “I inclose what I 
suspect to be a pretended American Paper, which, however, tho’ it should be found fictitious as 
to the Form [emphasis his], is undoubtedly true as to the Substance. For The English cannot deny 
such a Number of Murders having been really committed by their Instigation.”195 Franklin was 
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hopeful as new developments in the negotiation process moved America closer to peace on his 
terms. He jubilantly explained to Jay, “The Parliament of Britain have just passed an Act for 
exchanging American Prisoners. They have near 1100 in the Goals of England & Ireland, all 
committed as charged with high Treason. The Act is to impower the King, notwithstanding such 
Commitments to consider them as Prisoners of War according to the Law of Nations, and 
exchange them as such.” This progress toward prisoner exchange represented a change in the 
attitude of British officials that Franklin recognized, “This seems to be giving up their 
Pretensions of considering us as rebellious Subjects, and is a kind of Acknowledgment of our 
Independence.”196 Franklin believed the release and exchange of prisoners was severely limited 
throughout the war due primarily to the defector status that the British government had assigned 
to American soldiers. British policy that neglected basic civil liberties as well as international 
standards of war quickly changed with British desire to complete peace negotiations invited a 
rapid change in resolving American grievances. 
The Public Advertiser of London is one English newspaper that historians have 
determined published Franklin’s “Supplement.” There is also evidence that other newspapers in 
both Britain and America published either the first or second section as a testament to British 
atrocities.197 Horace Walpole, Earl of Orford wrote in a letter to the Countess of Ossory in 
October 1782, “Have you seen in the papers the excellent letter of Paul Jones to Sir Joseph 
Yorke? I doubt poor Sir Joseph cannot answer them!” Walpole recognized the tone and style of 
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the letter in his declaration, “Dr. Franklin himself, I should think, was the author.”198 Walpole’s 
remarks reveal that the “Supplement” did not deceive all of its readers; however, there were 
portions of the population that did not recognize Franklin’s satire. In America, the article was 
published by dozens of newspapers during the war, and until the mid-nineteenth century widely 
accepted as a genuine description of brutality. The “Supplement” especially became popular as 
indication of Indian barbarity in the early nineteenth century, used as a weapon of justification 
for the prejudices imposed on the native peoples by the laws and mandates that forced them out 
of their homes and land.199 
Historians have suggested that Franklin’s “Supplement” was propaganda; however, to 
imply the “Supplement” was propaganda implies that Franklin wrote the article with biased 
prejudice intending to influence public opinion on political matters. Though Franklin intended to 
influence political affairs by publishing the “Supplement” and he falsified his descriptions, there 
has been no establishment that Franklin purposefully wished to mislead the public on the 
contents of the “Supplement.” On the contrary, Franklin believed that the “Supplement” 
underrepresented the atrocities committed by the British. Franklin confessed to John Adams, “I 
believe the Number of People actually scalp’d in this murdering War by the Indians to exceed 
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what is mention’d in the Invoice, and that Muley Istmael (a happy Name for a Prince as obstinate 
as a Mule) is full as black a Tyrant as he is represented in Paul Jones’s pretended Letter . . .”200 
Despite Franklin’s blatant use of sarcasm, his vexations were not unfounded, though perhaps his 
descriptions were embellished. On the surface, Franklin’s intentions in the first section of the 
“Supplement” most apparently demonized the Indians; however, Franklin’s uneasiness rested not 
in what he labelled as Indian savagery but British manipulation of her people and allies. 
Franklin’s letters and essays revealed his dissatisfaction of British policy. His influence over 
peace negotiations provided him a more effectual avenue for acquiring peace and seeking justice 
for American losses than the “Supplement” offered. Franklin’s position on peace remained fairly 
consistent with his political expressions in the “Supplement,” and while the precise terms of 
Franklin’s initial peace were not met, his primary concerns were addressed and resolved. 
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Chapter 5: 
Conclusion 
“The pen is mightier than the sword,” famous words penned by Edward Bulwar-Lytton in 
his play Richelieu: Or, the Conspiracy, summarizes the poignant message: The written word is 
far more powerful than many weapons or armies. 201 Benjamin Franklin, perhaps more than any 
other person of his day, embodied this philosophy. Evident by the sheer volume of letters, 
essays, and articles he wrote, Franklin believed in the power of the written word, especially when 
conveying his dissatisfaction with the British Empire. More than he was willing to openly 
confront Parliament or the king, Franklin was inclined to record his displeasure by pen and 
publication. His words have persisted as landmarks of the Revolution and models for the protest 
and censure of tyranny and despotism. 
Because of his contributions to the varied fields of literature, science, politics, and 
philosophy, Benjamin Franklin is one of the most studied figures of American history. The 
research on Franklin’s social and cultural contributions spans over two centuries. Franklin 
himself even contributed to his own historical narrative in the form of his autobiography. Many 
prestigious scholars have examined his donations to American independence and colonial life, 
offering profound evaluations of his influence. Franklin’s plethora of letters, essays, and 
commentaries have allowed scholars the opportunity to explore the nuances of his brilliant mind. 
The ongoing work of Yale scholars such as Jonathan R. Dull, Ellen R. Cohn, and John M. 
Huffman as well as several other respected historians in the project commissioned by Yale 
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University and the American Philosophical Society has provided historians with an exhaustive 
record of Franklin’s publications and writings.  
Franklin’s opinions on government, cultural customs, and economics often challenged the 
standards of not only colonial American politics, but also those of the entire western world. As 
America progressed toward independence and eventually peace with Great Britain following the 
final battle campaigns of the Revolution, Franklin assumed a critical position in the negotiation 
process to end the conflict. Franklin had already established himself as an important diplomat 
and liaison between the British and the French before the Revolution as well as an influencer on 
public opinion in the turbulent years of the war. His place in arranging the Treaty of Paris and 
culminating lasting reconciliation proved central to the outcome of America’s future.  
On the eve of preliminary peace between America and Britain and over a year before the 
signing of the official Treaty of Paris in 1783, Franklin produced one of his most intriguing 
publications, the “Supplement” to the Boston Independent Chronicle. The “Supplement” was a 
sarcastic jab at the hypocrisy of the British Empire, but it was also a summary of Franklin’s most 
sacred justifications of liberty. While several historians have examined the value of the 
“Supplement” as one of Franklin’s most brilliant published satires, there lacks concentrated 
analysis on its historical significance in respect to Franklin’s political position. Historians of the 
nineteenth century such as Jared Sparks have offered cursory evaluations of the “Supplement”; 
and Luther Samuel Livingston in the early twentieth century, Carl Berger in the 1960s, several 
literary historians, and a few recent historians such as Gregory Evans Dowd in his work on 
deceptions of early America have presented concise, yet informative appraisals of Franklin’s 
brilliant deception. Carla Mulford remains one of the few scholars to examine the “Supplement” 
in depth by analyzing Franklin’s reasons for publishing the article as well as the implications of 
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his satirical messages. In her work Benjamin Franklin and the Ends of Empire and her article 
“Benjamin Franklin’s Savage Eloquence: Hoaxes from the Press at Pass, 1782,” Mulford offers a 
fresh perspective on Franklin’s “Supplement” and the meaning behind its political implications. 
Still, there persists a need for a deeper exploration of Franklin’s motives and suggestions 
presented in the “Supplement” as well as an evaluation of how Franklin’s “Supplement” related 
to his early political opinions.  
For Franklin, the “Supplement” offered an outlet, as did most of his writings, for an 
expression of his irritation with British imperial dominance and most importantly, British 
treatment of the American colonies. His “Supplement” was not the first enumeration of the 
exasperation over British policy or even the only written listing of British offenses; the 
Declaration of Independence had offered just that. However, the “Supplement” was unique in its 
blatant use of satire and sarcasm so convincingly cloaked in the suggestion of legitimate atrocity 
and brutality that it deceived readers for decades, and those who refused to believe its accounts 
still remained aware of British brutality. 202 
Franklin wrote his “Supplement” as an effort to publicize British misconduct and openly 
reveal the hypocrisy he believed initially caused the war. He trusted his efforts had the potential 
to sway British opinion on settling peace with the United States. Despite these elevated 
intentions, Franklin must have known that some of those citizens reading the “Supplement” 
would have taken its claims seriously to the point of believing that such disturbing details were 
true, especially those readers in England who did not have firsthand experience of the 
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Revolution. There is no clear expression from Franklin that he intended to mislead; Franklin was 
not ignorant to the effects of propaganda although he believed he did not exaggerate the amount 
of scalpings which took place throughout the Revolution.203 
This research has sought to describe the issues and situations which prompted Franklin to 
write the “Supplement,” including Indian attacks led by the British on American soldiers and 
civilians as well as the circumstances involving John Paul Jones and the Bonhomme Richard 
which were the basis for Franklin’s article. This research has also attempted to understand the 
principles which fueled Franklin’s desire to write his satirical exposé as well as analyze his 
motives and values regarding the British Empire. Franklin’s first letter was perhaps his most 
vicious. The graphic portrayal of Indian violence as well as the blatant mockery of British 
indifference to the suffering of American colonists revealed Franklin’s disgust with British 
policy. His descriptions were not meant to highlight Indian aggression but to condemn the use of 
Indian force against America as well as British inability to constrain these forces. Franklin’s 
second letter emphasized the hypocrisy of the British political system and the corruption of its 
politicians. He included insults that underscored the most important points of contention 
throughout the war. Collectively, the letters of the “Supplement” revealed Franklin’s frustration 
with Parliament and the Crown on their management of the American colonies, his primary 
focus in peace negotiations. Through his own persistence, Franklin achieved a favorable outcome 
for America in the peace process. 
Franklin’s complaints were limited by his own perceptions of British conduct. The 
primary arguments of the “Supplement” depended on British injustices. Franklin did not include 
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objective points in his articles on the conduct of American forces or her allies. Though the 
“Supplement” was limited to the censure of British behavior in the war, no side remained 
innocent of misconduct. American and British forces, as well as French, Indian, and Hessian 
troops were all guilty of some level of inhumane behavior. This research has not attempted to 
discuss all atrocities committed by all groups. The examples of British and Indian atrocities 
presented are meant to give context to the references Franklin made within his “Supplement.” 
Several Indian tribes and nations were involved with the American War for Independence in 
addition to the Iroquois nations discussed in this analysis. For this research, however, there has 
only been focus given to the Iroquois’ involvement, due to Franklin’s singular reference to the 
Iroquois tribes in his first letter of the “Supplement.”204  
The American Indians suffered many atrocities at the hands of both the British and 
American soldiers and civilians. Their hardship and affliction was overlooked for a time in 
historical scholarship, but great strides to express their suffering have been made in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries. The foundation of this research has primarily rested on the brutality 
committed against American civilians and soldiers during the Revolution or at least Franklin’s 
perception of it based on his claims in the “Supplement”; however, this has not been expressed in 
an effort to disregard any violence committed on behalf of American civilians and soldiers. To 
name and describe the total number of atrocities committed by all parties involved in the 
Revolution would take far more pages than presented in this research. The scope of this 
examination has been limited to the points discussed in Franklin’s article.  
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The “Supplement” has only recently come under the examination of scholars and 
historians as an important piece of political expression. Even still, the “Supplement” remains 
confined to discussions on propaganda and Franklin’s literary genius. Franklin’s writings offer 
historians a unique and comprehensive look into revolutionary America from the perspective of 
someone who was not only well-informed, but also well-versed, well-read, and well-traveled. 
These characteristics give historians the opportunity to chart the progression of the political 
ideals and cultural conceptions of one man for half a century. Franklin did not merely sequester 
his ideas for private application; however, Franklin published and promoted his ideas for public 
consumption. The “Supplement” did not fall short of Franklin’s usual standards. Despite its 
obscurity, the “Supplement” remains an articulate expression of Franklin’s most precious 
convictions, and it is worthy of greater examination and review in the historical narrative of 
Franklin’s life and the American Revolution.  
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